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DEMOCRACY AND DISTORTION
Guy-Uriel E. Charlest

This Article contends that judicial supervision of excessive manipulation of electoral linesfor partisanpurposes--politicalgerrymandering-may
be justified in a mature democracy. The Article responds to the debate among
courts and commentators over whether political gerymanderingpresents any
constitutionally relevant harms and, further, whether courts may be able to
resolve the structural issues presented by political gerrymandering claims.
Drawingfrom political theory and political science, this Article develops a
theory of institutional distortion and provides a justification for aggressive
judicial review of questions of democraticgovernance. The Article does not
argue that the United States Supreme Court should regulate political gerrymandering; instead, it argues that such regulation can be justified. This
Article also develops a framework of election law dualism to resolve the structural challenges that political gerrymanderingposes to adjudication.
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INTRODUCTION

The United States Supreme Court continues to struggle mightily
with the complexity of democratic governance. Since its early and
successful, yet controversial, foray into politics in Baker v. Carr,' the
Court has played a significant role in defining the contours of democratic politics. Yet, notwithstanding its active involvement, the Court
has failed to develop a coherent theory ofjudicial oversight of politics. 2 This is a fundamental problem because it yields ajurisprudence
that lacks a clear sense of the constitutional harm that judicial review
is envisaged to vindicate.3 Perhaps no controversy better illustrates
1
369 U.S. 186 (1962).
2 See Heather K. Gerken, The Costs and Causes of Minimalism in Voting Cases: Baker v.
Carr and Its Progeny, 80 N.C. L. REv. 1411, 1413-14 (2002) (arguing that the Court lacks a
coherent theory of politics and noting the resultant costs).
3 SeeJudith Reed, Sense and Nonsense: Standing in the RacialDistricting Cases as a Window on the Supreme Court's View of the Right to Vote, 4 MICH. J. RACE & L. 389, 456-57 (1999)
("Without a better defined theory of democracy or an appreciation of representation issues
and the problems jurisdictions face, the Court has condemned itself to ad hoc decision
making because it lacks a framework.").
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the Court's ambivalence toward establishing the proper demarcation
between law and politics than its struggles with the justiciability of political gerrymandering. While the Court's political gerrymandering
decisions occasionally reflect an intuition that judicial review is necessary to cabin overreaching by state actors, it has failed to operational4
ize this intuition into a sound and coherent framework.
This is not to say that the Court has not tried. Indeed, it has
attempted to resolve the constitutional status of political gerrymanders in two extremely fractured cases: Davis v. Bandemer5 and Vieth v.
Jubelirer.6 Neither case produced a majority opinion, and both cases
left open several crucial questions, including the threshold inquiry of
whether political gerrymandering claims are justiciable. 7 Further, the
Court has also failed to resolve several other important issues, namely:
explaining the constitutional harm caused by political gerrymandering, settling upon a doctrinal approach to resolve political gerrymandering claims, providing a manageable standard, and offering a
justification for judicial supervision of partisan line drawing. 8 This
confusion, illustrated by the crosscutting opinions in Vieth, is the con4
See Samuel Issacharoff, Gerrymanderingand Political Cartels, 116 HARV. L. REV. 593,
597 (2002).
5
478 U.S. 109 (1986). The Court's fragmented decision in Bandemer featured three
significant opinions. See id. While six Justices agreed that political gerrymandering was
justiciable, they differed markedly in their rationales. See id.
6 541 U.S. 267 (2004). In Vieth, four Justices, per Justice Antonin Scalia's plurality
opinion declaring the judgment of the Court, concluded that political gerrymandering
claims are not justiciable because the law does not provide any judicially manageable standards to apply in these cases. See id. at 305-06 (plurality opinion). Justice Scalia, the late
Chief Justice William H. Rehnquist, Justice Sandra Day O'Connor, and Justice Clarence
Thomas would thus declare defeat and abdicate the field altogether. See id. (plurality opinion). Four other Justices concluded that political gerrymandering claims are justiciable
based on three different rationales. Justice David Souter, joined by Justice Ruth Bader
Ginsburg, would adopt a five-part test based on the racial vote dilution case of Thornburgv.
Gingles, 478 U.S. 109 (1986), that would employ the burden-shifting framework of McDonnell Douglas v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973), the landmark employment discrimination case.
See Vieth, 541 U.S. at 346-53 (Souter, J., dissenting). Justice John Paul Stevens would use
the bizarre-shape test announced by the Court in the paradigm-shifting racial gerrymandering case of Shaw v. Reno, 509 U.S. 630 (1993). See Vieth, 541 U.S. at 334-36, 339 (Stevens, J., dissenting). Justice Stephen Breyer would employ a flexible standard that would
attempt to distinguish unjustified entrenchment of majoritarian power from justified entrenchment based upon legitimate electoral results. See id. at 365-67 (Breyer, J., dissenting). Lastly, Justice Anthony Kennedy maintained that he "would not foreclose all
possibility ofjudicial relief if some limited and precise rationale were found to correct an
established violation of the Constitution in some redistricting cases." Id. at 306 (Kennedy,
J., concurring).
7
The Court ultimately clarified this issue in its most recent law and politics case,
League of United Latin American Citizens v. Perry, 126 S.Ct. 2594 (2006).
8
As Professor Gardner stated, "Vieth thus appears to resolve nothing, while inviting
litigants to continue bringing what have proven uniformly to be fruitless actions in the
hope of stumbling blindly upon some legal standard that might supply the as-yet unknown
incantation necessary to evoke judicial relief." James A. Gardner, A Post-Vieth Strategy for
Litigating Partisan GerrymanderingClaims, 3 ELEcr[ON LJ. 643, 643 (2004).
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sequence of a Court that is utterly at sea with respect to its role in
policing the manipulation of democratic outcomes by political elites.
Unfortunately, the academic literature on law and politics is similarly divided. Some, whom I term structuralists, point to the need for
courts to stem the structural pathologies of democratic politics, such
as the lack of competitiveness in elections, and argue in favor of meaningful judicial review of political gerrymandering plans. 9 Others,
whom I term individualists, respond that courts are only suited for
resolving individual rights claims, e.g., racial gerrymandering disputes.10 They maintain that structural questions, which raise difficult
baseline problems such as how to determine the appropriate level of
competitiveness in elections, are the responsibility of elected officials
and best addressed by the political process rather than by the judicial
system."I Individualists further contend that there are no judicially
manageable standards available to resolve political gerrymandering
disputes. 12 Consequently, they conclude that courts are ill-suited for
resolving structural claims and must not involve themselves in these
3
divisive questions of politics and policy.'
The challenge individualists pose seems formidable. Structuralists on the Court have focused their attention on the fateful exercise
of determining whether political groups are similar enough to racial
groups to justify judicial involvement.' 4 Structuralists in the academy
have emphasized the shortcomings of individualism and the importance of competition to democratic elections. 15 However, these structuralist responses have mainly served to highlight the fact that
structuralism has not sufficiently evolved to provide a comprehensive
framework for directing judicial supervision of democratic politics or
a compelling account of the harm that political gerrymandering
causes.
This Article addresses the shortcomings of the structuralist model
and responds to the challenge of the individualists. Part I argues that
the central harm of political gerrymandering is what I term institutional distortion-political elites' manipulation of governance institu9 See, e.g., Samuel Issacharoff & Richard H. Pildes, Politics as Markets: PartisanLockups
of the Democratic Process, 50 STAN. L. REV. 643, 648 (1998).
10 See Whitcomb v. Chavis, 403 U.S. 124, 149 (1971); Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 287
(1962) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting); Richard H. Pildes, Why Rights Are Not Trumps: Social
Meanings, Expressive Harms, and Constitutionalism, 27J. LEGAL STUD. 725, 727 (1998).
See, e.g., Bruce E. Cain, Garrett's Temptation, 85 VA. L. REV. 1589, 1600 (1999).
1t
12
See Vieth v. Jubelirer, 541 U.S. 267, 281-306 (2004) (plurality opinion).
13
See Cain, supra note 11, at 1600.
14
See Vieth, 541 U.S. at 267; Davis v. Bandemer, 478 U.S. 109 (1986).
15
See H. B. MAYO, AN INTRODUCTION TO DEMOCRATIC THEORY 61 (1960); HANNA
FENICHEL PITKIN, THE CONCEPT OF REPRESENTATION 234 (1967); Richard H. Pildes, The Supreme Court 2003 Term-Foreword: The Constitutionalizationof Democratic Politics, 118 HARV. L.
REv. 28, 53 (2004).
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tions or electoral structures to distort electoral outcomes in order to
produce a particular result. This Part concludes that institutional distortion undermines the principles that legitimate democratic practices and interferes with the central aim of electoral systems, which is
to reflect as accurately as possible the preferences of the relevant
electorate. 16

Part II explains why the Court has struggled with the problem of
political gerrymandering and demonstrates how the Court has relied
upon the racial dilution cases to help it make sense of the harm
caused by political gerrymandering. This Part also argues that this
race-politics dialectic is part of a long-running doctrinal dispute with
respect to the proper characterization of claims alleging racial discrimination in the political process, the utility of race as a guide for
thinking about politics, and the constitutional limitations on judicial
review of the political process.
Part III explains why the inquiry into judicially manageable standards for resolving gerrymandering claims is not a useful one: Commentators have misunderstood Justice Antonin Scalia's argument in
Vieth to be a descriptive one about judicial administrability rather than
a prescriptive one about the proper role of the Judiciary in supervising
questions of political governance.
Part IV explores the justifications for judicial review of democratic governance claims and addresses the central points of the individualists by exploring their arguments in depth. In addition, this
Part develops a framework that I term "election law dualism" for addressing the structural challenges that political gerrymandering poses
to adjudication. This framework demonstrates that to effectively resolve democratic governance claims, courts must be willing to explicitly deploy a rights-based approach that ostensibly focuses on the
individual while self-consciously employing a structural account that
seeks to understand the pathologies of the political process in institutional terms. The Court successfully navigated these issues in the reapportionment context, and it may do so in the context of political
gerrymandering as well. Lastly, Part V argues that the administrability
barrier to political gerrymandering claims may be overcome and suggests several judicially administrable standards that courts could apply
to resolve these claims.
16
This is the first article in a series. In this Article, I address only the questions of
harm and justification for judicial review of partisan line drawing. The second article will
offer the First Amendment as a doctrinal framework for thinking about political gerrymandering claims. I have previously sketched out the contours of this approach in two law
review articles. See Guy-Uriel E. Charles, Judging the Law ofPolitics, 103 MICH. L. Rv. 1099,
1131-40 (2005) [hereinafter Charles, Politics]; Guy-Uriel E. Charles, Racial Identity, Electoral
Structures, and the FirstAmendment Right of Association, 91 CAL. L. Rv. 1209 (2003) [hereinafter Charles, Identity].
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This Article concludes thatjudicial review of the rules that constitute governance institutions is justifiable. To be clear, the argument
advanced in this Article is not that courts must involve themselves in
the political process to address the structural pathologies of that process. Rather, the point is that courts can engage in the political process, even in an aggressive way, and that such involvement would be
justified. Part of the inquiry here is to explore whether it matters if we
take fundamental democratic principles seriously even in a mature democracy. I suggest that it does matter, and thus, there is no need to
fret over the possibility of greater judicial supervision of democratic
politics.
I
INSTITUTIONAL DISTORTION

In order to address the problem of political gerrymandering, one
must have a theory of harm. A jurisprudence that lacks a clear and
concrete articulation of the constitutional harm it seeks to vindicate
causes doctrinal incoherence because without a conception of the
harm, it is difficult for the courts to distinguish among doctrinal approaches and, likewise, to settle on one. Thus, without a clear articulation of the harm political gerrymandering causes, courts are
currently open to any and all doctrinal frameworks that promise relief, no matter how phantasmic. Indeed, as some commentators have
noted, courts have been willing to entertain a series of varied doctrinal possibilities in an attempt to limit political gerrymandering, including several provisions of the Constitution, sundry judge-made
17
rules, various federal statutes, and numerous state law doctrines.
The voluminous literature on political gerrymandering also lacks
a clear description of the specific harm that the manipulation of elec18
toral institutions and the distortion of political outcomes yield.
While commentators have argued that the federal courts should vindicate the constitutional values that political gerrymandering infringes, 19 the literature has not developed a coherent account of the
17 See, e.g., Samuel Issacharoff & Pamela S. Karlan, Where to Draw the Line?: Judicial
Review of Political Gerymanders, 153 U. PA. L. REV. 541, 542 (2004).
18 For some thoughtful articulations of the harm on other grounds, see Issacharoff,
supra note 4, at 600 (defining the harm as anticompetitive behavior); Daniel D. Polsby &
Robert D. Popper, The Third Criterion: Compactness as a ProceduralSafeguardAgainst Partisan
Gerrymandering, 9 YALE L. & POL'v REV. 301, 304-05 (1991)
(arguing that
"[g]errymandering violates the American constitutional tradition by conceding to legislatures a power of self-selection" and by permitting legislatures to "insulat[e] themselves
from the popular will").
19 See, e.g., Mitchell N. Berman, Managing Gerymandering,83 TEx. L. REv. 781, 783
(2005) (asserting that the "excessive partisanship" gerrymandering enables violates the
Constitution); Michael J. Klarman, MajoritarianJudicialReview: The EntrenchmentProblem, 85
GEo. L.J. 491, 534 (1997) ("Gerrymandering has nothing to commend it-the practice is
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harm. Without such an account, it is difficult to understand whether
political gerrymandering is a structural pathology of the political process that must be corrected by judicial review or merely a natural self20
correcting outgrowth of normal politics.
Part L.A argues that the harm political gerrymandering causes is
the manipulation of the very rules that both constitute governance
institutions and legitimize their outcomes as democratic by self-interested political actors using the power of the state. 2' Although this articulation of the harm may appear at first to be elementary, the Court
has surprisingly been unable to articulate the harm in anything other
than extremely vague and intuitive generalizations. In fact, the plurality opinion in Bandemer neglected even to discuss the harm caused by
political gerrymandering aside from ambiguously stating that "the issue is one of representation." 2 2 This significant limitation precluded
the Court from developing a framework that would vindicate constitutional values. Thus, it is not surprising that all nine Justices abandoned the hapless Bandemer plurality, and that, as Part I.B explains,
the Justices in Vieth struggled mightily to articulate the harm caused by
political gerrymandering.
A.

Political Gerrymandering

This subpart argues that the problem with political gerrymandering is the intentional manipulation of democratic instituti6ns by state
actors. 2 3 This manipulation undermines the democratic principles
that legitimate democratic practices. It is this loss of legitimacy that is
entrenchment, pure and simple."); Michael E. Lewyn, How to Limit Gerrymandering,45 FLA.
L. REv. 403, 407 (1993) (arguing that gerrymandering is antimajoritarian).
See Larry Alexander, Lost in the PoliticalThicket, 41 FLA. L. REV. 563 (1989); Nathan20
iel Persily, In Defense of Foxes GuardingHenhouses: The Case forJudicial Acquiescence to Incumbent-Protecting Gerymanders, 116 HARV. L. REV. 649 (2002); Peter H. Schuck, The Thickest
Thicket: Partisan Gerrymanderingand JudicialRegulation of Politics, 87 COLUM. L. REV. 1325
(1987).
21
To be clear, I am concerned in this Article with the composition of electoral structures or election systems as they affect governance institutions only-not all institutions of
democratic governance. Governance institutions are the fundamental mechanism of legitimacy and accountability in democratic politics. This Article is concerned with the rules
that constitute these institutions and the manipulation of those rules by state actors.
22
Davis v. Bandemer, 478 U.S. 109, 124 (1986). For criticism of Bandemer along these
lines, see Daniel Hays Lowenstein, Bandemer s Gap: Gerrymanderingand Equal Protection, in
POLITICAL GERRYMANDERING AND THE COURTS 64, 74-79 (Bernard Grofman ed., 1990).
23
Note that the argument here is not about competition, the conception of harm
advanced by Professors Issacharoff and Pildes. See Issacharoff, supra note 4, at 600; Richard
H. Pildes, Competitive, Deliberative, and Rights-Oriented Democracy, 3 ELECTION LJ. 685, 686
(2004). Instead, it concerns institutional distortion, which envisages a broader framework
than that advanced by the competition model. In the institutional distortion framework,
competition is one important democratic value among many. The argument advanced
here is thus fully consistent with the competition model. However, the focus here is on
mirroring the underlying preferences of the electorate as opposed to artificially interjecting competition into the electoral process where the process is inherently noncompetitive.
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the harm of political gerrymandering. To support this argument, I
employ political theory, social choice theory, and political science to
demonstrate that there is a tension between how democratic practices
ought to work according to democratic theory and how democratic
practices do in fact work according to political scientists and social
choice theorists. Thus, the problem underlying political gerrymandering is the struggle to reconcile democratic theory with democratic
practices.
1.

On Democratic Theory

Democratic politics depends upon the existence of a series of
principles and values from which it draws its legitimacy. 24 One of the
essential principles is that fundamental electoral outcomes ought to
be the consequence of the preferences of democratic citizens. As
John Locke stated, "[t]he Constitution of the Legislative is the first
and fundamental Act of Society .

.

. without which no one Man, or

number of Men, amongst them, can have Authority of making Laws,
25
that shall be binding to the rest."
The central purpose of electoral systems is to accurately register
the preferences of the relevant electorate. Under the standard democratic account, the democratic ideal is responsiveness. 2 6 Some astute
students of the democratic process have maintained that democracy
"involves a connection between the policy preferences of citizens...
and what their governments do." 27 Or, as Hanna Pitkin stated, "representing... means acting in the interest of the represented, in a man28
ner responsive to them."

A foundational tenet of representative democracy is the principle
that self-government is actuated through the process of meaningful
24 See generally John D. Lewis, The Elements of Democracy, 34 AM. POL. SCI. REv. 467
(1940) (discussing the essential elements of democratic theory).
25

JOHN LocKE, Two TREATISES OF GOVERNMENT 425-26 (Peter Laslett ed., Cambridge

Univ. Press 1960) (1690) (emphasis omitted).
26
See SIDNEY VERBA & NORMAN H. NIE, PARTICIPATION IN AMERICA: POLITICAL DEMOCRACY AND SOCIAL EQuALITy 300 (1972) ("Responsiveness is what democracy is supposed to
be about. . . ."). For a definition of responsiveness, see Guy-Uriel E. Charles, Constitutional
Pluralism and Democratic Politics:Reflections on the InterpretativeApproach of Baker v. Carr, 80
N.C. L. REv. 1103, 1149 (2002) ("Responsiveness conveys how well democratic institutions
track the substantive preferences of the electorate. The more democratic institutions react
antiphonally to the expressed preferences of the electorate the more they can be classified
as responsive."); Bernard Manin et al., Introduction to DEMOCRACY, ACCOUNTABILITY, AND
REPRESENTATION 9 (Bernard Manin et al. eds., 1999) ("A government is 'responsive' if it
adopts policies that are signaled as preferred by citizens.").
27
BENJAMIN I. PAGE & ROBERT Y. SHAPIRO, THE RATIONAL PUBLIC: FIFTY YEARS OF
TRENDS IN AMERICANS' POLICY PREFERENCES 383 (1992).
28
HANNA FENICHEL PITKIN, THE CONCEPT OF REPRESENTATION 209 (1967).
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periodic elections in which voters choose their representatives. 2) Elections, as some commentators have noted, "are at the core of the American political system. They are the way we choose government leaders,
a source of the government's legitimacy, and a means by which citizens try to influence public policy."3-" Or, as George Kateb explained:
In a representative democracy the source of law and public policies
is a collection of officeholders who have attained office by winning
contested elections. The contested elections, by their very nature,
provide some general guidance to the winners concerning public
opinion and preferences on laws and public policies that have been
institution of repreand are to be made.... Thus, the fundamental
3
sentative democracy is the electoral system. '
However, in order for elections to fulfill their purpose in a polity,
they must be meaningful. That is, at the very least, their processes
must provide the opportunity for genuine contestation, and their outcomes must not be preordained by the design of institutional struc-

tures.

In this democratic ideal, representation is the result of a

contest among competing and self-defined constituencies. State actors and political elites pervert and violate this ideal whenever they
distort the contest and assign representation. If elections are barely

contested and democratic outcomes are largely predetermined by
state-prescribed institutional arrangements, one cannot operationalize fundamental concepts of democracy such as self-government, consent of the governed, responsiveness, and free association. As
democratic theorists rightly remind us, these abstract concepts are
rendered operative and meaningful through the medium of democratic institutions. 32 Pitkin stated the point best: "Representative gov29

See DON

HERZOG, HAPPY SLAVES:

A

CRITIQUE OF CONSENT THEORY 199

(1989) ("Vot-

ers... who choose between competing candidates ... are... masterless men.");
MANIN, THE PRINCIPLES OF REPRESENTATIVE GOVERNMENT

BERNARD

85-86 (1997) (noting the crucial

connection between consent and elections). As Giovanni Sartori maintained:
Since in order to have democracy we must have, to some degree, a government of the people, let us immediately ask: When do we find a "governing
people," the demos in the act or the role of governing? The answer is: At
elections. This is no belittlement, for the democratic process is indeed encapsulated in elections and electing.
GIOVANNI SARTORI, THE THEORY OF DEMOCRACY REVISITED 86 (1987).
30
RAYMOND E. WOLFINGER & STEVEN J. ROSENSTONE, WHO VOTES? 1 (1980); see also
MAYO, supra note 15, at 61 ("[C]hoosing the policy-makers (representatives) at elections
held at more or less regular intervals" is the "institutional embodiment of the principle [of
popular control of policy-makers that is) universally regarded as indispensable in modern
democracies.").
31
George Kateb, The Moral Distinctiveness of Representative Democracy, 91 ETHICS 357,
357 (1981); see also Pildes, supra note 23, at 686 ("[E]lections tie, however loosely, the
exercise of public power to the interests and values of citizens .... At a minimum, elections make the identity of those who wield public power accountable to the vote of
citizens.").
32 See e.g., HERZOG, supra note 29, at 203-08.
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ernment is not defined by particular actions at a particular moment,
but by long-term systematic arrangements-by institutions and the
33
way in which they function.
Moreover, if democratic institutions are severely compromised,
they cannot provide any guidance to winners regarding the preferences of the electorate, and they fail to serve their accountability functions. 34 Indeed, minimizing the ultimate accountability function of
elections-the electorate's ability to vote out unsatisfactory representatives-is the goal of gerrymandering.
Elections are necessary to democracy because they legitimate
35
democratic practices by ensuring responsiveness and accountability.
Elections in a democracy are the primary mechanism for institutionalizing responsiveness and accountability. 36 This function, captured in
the pithy phrase "consent of the governed, '3 7 is what differentiates
38
elections from selection by lot and legitimates the political order.
2.

On DemocraticPractices

As compelling as the standard democratic account is, it is complicated by the role of institutions and political elites in the formation of
citizen preferences. This complication occurs because citizen preferences are sometimes exogenous and other times endogenous. 39 That
is, sometimes citizens have fixed preferences, and those preferences
drive political outcomes; in those instances, citizen preferences are
exogenous. In other instances, citizen preferences are a function of
their political context; in those cases, preferences are endogenous because they are the product of external contextual stimuli. As a result,
in those cases, political outcomes cannot be explained accurately
solely in terms of citizen preferences.
supra note 28, at 234.
See Gary C. Jacobson, Strategic Politicians and the Dynamics of U.S. House Elections,
1946-86, 83 Am.POL. Sci. REv. 773, 773 (1989) ("Free, competitive elections are supposed
to encourage leaders to govern responsibly because voters can fire them if they do not.
But the kind of accountability elections enforce depends on the structure of electoral
politics.").
35
See Manin et al., supra note 26, at 10 ("Governments are 'accountable' if citizens
can discern representative from unrepresentative governments and can sanction them appropriately, retaining in office those incumbents who perform well and ousting from office
those who do not.").
-36
See PITKIN, supra note 28, at 234 ("Our concern with elections and electoral machinery, and particularly with whether elections are free and genuine, results from our conviction that such machinery is necessary to ensure systematic responsiveness.").
37
THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE para. 2 (U.S. 1776).
38
See HERZOG, supra note 29, at 198-208.
39
For useful and brief introductory material to the literature in various disciplines on
preference formation, see James N. Druckman & Arthur Lupia, Preference Formation,3 ANN.
REv. POL. ScI. 1 (2000).
33

34

PITKIN,
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Debates in political science with respect to party identification
demonstrate the distinction between exogenous and endogenous
preferences. One model of party identification posits that citizens
have stable party identifications that are largely unaffected by changes
in issues or events.

4

These party identifications are fixed, exogenous

preferences that explain not only presidential election outcomes but
also how citizens evaluate issues, candidates, and political events. 4' An
alternative, revisionist model maintains that partisan identification is
both exogenous and endogenous; it shifts in response to political
elites, candidates, the emergence or disappearance of political issues,
and other political variables. 42 Under that theory, in order to understand political events, one would have to understand the political variables and institutions that alter party identifications.
A similar debate exists with respect to the formation of public
opinion and the extent to which the political process responds to public opinion versus the extent to which it creates public opinion. The
standard democratic account envisions a positive and consequential
relationship between the public's opinion and the actions of elected
officials. 43 That is, elected officials and political institutions will respond to citizens' political preferences. 44 But the empirical evidence
for this exogenous account is at best mixed. While there is some indication that public opinion may sometimes serve exclusively as an inde40
See ANGUS CAMPBELL ET AL., THE AMERICAN VOTER (1960); Donald Philip Green &
Bradley Palmquist, How Stable Is Party Identification?, 16 PoL. BEHAV. 437 (1994); Donald
Philip Green & Bradley Palmquist, Of Artifacts and PartisanInstability, 34 AM. POL. ScI. REV.
872 (1990). But see PAUL R. ABRAMSON, GENERATIONAL CHANGE IN AMERICAN POLITICS
51-70 (1975).
41
As Campbell and his colleagues stated:

For virtually any collection of states, counties, wards, precincts, or other
political units one may care to examine, the correlation of the party division of the vote in successive elections is likely to be high. Often a change
of candidates and a broad alteration in the nature of the issues disturb very
little the relative partisanship of a set of electoral units, which suggests that
great numbers of voters have party attachments that persist through time.
CAMPBELL ET AL., supra note 40, at 121.
42
The path-breaking article here both in terms of methodology and theory isJohn E.
Jackson, Issues, Party Choices, and PresidentialVotes, 19 AM. J. POL. SCI. 161 (1975). For further discussion of this theory, see Janet M. Box-Steffensmeier & Renee M. Smith, The Dynamics of Aggregate Partisanship,90 AM. POL. Sci. REV. 567 (1996); Charles H. Franklin, Issue
Preferences, Socialization, and the Evolution ofParty Identification, 28 AM.J. POL. SCI. 459 (1984);
Charles H. Franklin, Measurement and the Dynamics of Party Identification, 14 POL. BEHAv. 297
(1992); Charles H. Franklin & John E. Jackson, The Dynamics of Party Identification, 77 AM.
POL. ScL REV. 957 (1983); Elisabeth R. Gerber &John E. Jackson, Endogenous Preferences and
the Study of Institutions, 87 AM. POL. SCI. REv. 639 (1993); Benjamin I. Page & Calvin C.
Jones, Reciprocal Effects of Policy Preferences, Party Loyalties and the Vote, 73 AM. POL. ScI. REV.
1071 (1979).
43
See, e.g., PAGE & SHAPIRO, supra note 27, at 383.
44
See, e.g., PITKIN, supra note 28, at 209. The standard account also assumes that citizens have the capacity for making political judgments. See, e.g., id. at 43, 232.
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pendent influence on the political process, 45 the evidence is
overwhelming that there is a reciprocal relationship between public
opinion and public policy: Social and political institutions and actors
mediate-and in some instances manipulate-public opinion, which
46
in turn serves as a justification for political action.
Consider in this vein the study that political scientists Lawrence
Jacobs and Robert Shapiro conducted of Bill Clinton's welfare reform
program and Newt Gingrich's "Contract with America." 47 With respect to Clinton's welfare reform, Jacobs and Shapiro stated:
[T] he president and his aides used polls and focus groups to craft
their presentations in order to most effectively "win" public backing.
They attempted to move public opinion to close the gap with what
most Americans preferred ....

Public opinion research, then, did

not guide policymaking; rather, policy decisions guided the reargusearch on public opinion in order to identify the language,
48
ments, and symbols most likely to persuade Americans.
They concluded that instead of trying to follow public opinion, politicians "use research on public opinion to pinpoint the most alluring
words, symbols, and arguments in an attempt to move public opinion
49
to support their desired policies."

Summarizing the research on the formation of public opinion,
some commentators have concluded that "common patterns of political thinking in mass publics can be viewed as politically constructed
outcomes. '"50 Indeed, the observation is applicable to explain not only
the formation of public opinion or partisan identification but also
45
See Robert S. Erikson et al., Dynamic Representation, 89 AM. POL. Sci. REv. 543, 559
(1995) ("[L]arge-scale shifts in public opinion yield corresponding large-scale shifts in government action.").
See BENJAMIN GINSBERG, THE CAPTIVE PUBLIC: How MASS OPINION PROMOTES STATE
46
POWER (1986); Si-taro IYENGAR & DONALD R. KINDER, NEWS THAT MATTERS (1987); LAWRENCE R. JACOBS & ROBERT Y. SHAPIRO, POLITICIANS DON'T PANDER: POLITICAL MANIPULATION AND THE Loss OF DEMOCRATIC RESPONSIVENESS (2000); PAGE & SHAPIRO, supra note 27;
JOHN R. ZALLER, THE NATURE AND ORIGINS OF MASS OPINION (1992); see also Kim Quaile
Hill & Patricia A. Hurley, Dyadic Representation Reappraised,43 AM. J. POL. SCI. 109 (1999)
(examining circumstances in which the relationship between public opinion and democratic representation is most likely to be reciprocal); Thomas E. Nelson & Donald R.
Kinder, Issue Frames and Group-Centrism in American Public Opinion, 58J. POL. 1055 (1996)
(concluding that public opinion is more strongly defined by social group identities if issues
are framed to explain benefits to particular social groups).
47 JACOBS & SHAPIRO, supra note 46.
48
Id. at 76. Their findings on Gingrich's "Contract with America" were very similar.

See id. at 263-77.
49
Id. at xv.
50
Suzanne Mettler &Joe Soss, The Consequences of Public Policyfor Democratic Citizenship:

Bridging Policy Studies and Mass Politics, 2

PERSP. ON POL.

55, 58 (2004); see also GINSBERG,

supra note 46, at 148 ("[T]he marketplace of ideas is dominated by the views of elite strata.
The more exposed they are to the market, the more likely ordinary people are to see the
world through the eyes of the upper classes.").
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that of political outcomes more generally. 5' Perhaps Josep Colomer
stated it best when he concluded that "political institutions shape actors' strategies, and ...

the latter produce collective outcomes. Insti-

tutions provide information, opportunities, incentives, and constraints
for both citizens and leaders choosing certain strategies, and it is only
through the intermediation of actors' strategic decisions that collec52
tive outcomes can be explained."
The observation that institutions shape public opinion is not new,
although we are only beginning to come to grips with its implications.
Social choice theorists and political scientists have long appreciated
that political institutions exert independent influence on the distribution of political power, public policy, and political outcomes. 5 3 As William Riker stated in making the case for studying and understanding
political institutions, public policy "outcomes are not ...

wholly ran-

dom and unexpected." 54 In fact, these outcomes are fairly predictable
because "decisions are customarily made within the framework of
known rules, which are what we commonly call institutions." 55 Thus,
in a process I term institutionalism, institutions shape the substance of
political decisions and public policy outcomes.
Examples abound of the relationship between public policy outcomes and political institutions. 56 Some scholars have argued that
American electoral structures and political institutions are partly responsible for the failure of the United States to develop a welfare state
similar to the one in Europe. 57 Others have argued that the United
States' two-party system is not necessarily the product of public policy
preferences of the electorate but instead may reflect the propensity of

SeeJosEP M. COLOMER, POLITICAL INSTITUTIONS: DEMOCRACY AND SOCIAL CHOICE 4

51

(2001).
52

Id.

53

See, e.g., William H. Riker, Implicationsfrom the Disequilibrium of Majority Rule for the

Study of Institutions, 74 AM. POL. Sci. REV. 432, 443 (1980) ("[T]he particular structure of an

institution is at least as likely to be predictive of socially enforced values as are the preferences of the citizen body.").
54
Id.
55
Id.
56
See id. For an introduction to the purposes that different types of electoral systems
serve, see Donald L. Horowitz, Electoral Systems and Their Goals: A Primer for Decision Makers,

14J.
57

DEMOCRACY

115 (2003).

See, e.g., Alberto Alesina et al., Why Doesn't the United States Have a European-Style

Welfare State, 2

BROOKINGS PAPERS ON ECON.

see Riker, supra note 53, at 443.

ACTIvrY 187 (2001). For related examples,
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single-member districts to produce and maintain two dominant 58 and
centrist parties.

59

Furthermore, other scholars have recently demonstrated that the
design of electoral structures profoundly affects the allocation and distribution of public funds. 60 Specifically with respect to malapportionment, or unequal representation, these scholars concluded that the
Court's decision in Baker v. Cary6 l "fundamentally transformed the
politics of public finance in the American states" by introducing and
implementing the equipopulation principle. 62 Thus, the distribution
of public funds from states to counties is not merely a function of
intentional public policy choices. 63 An important implication of this
study is that the composition of electoral structures yields predictable
and often intentional public policy outcomes with distinct and directional biases. 64 We are only beginning to appreciate the relationship

65
between electoral structures and public policy effects.

3.

Reconciling Democratic Theory with Democratic Practice

Institutionalism calls into question some basic assumptions of the
standard democratic account. Democratic theory envisions an ideal
of consequential political participation by citizens. 66 "Ancient liberty," legal theorist Don Herzog maintains, "is the right to participate
58
See MAURICE DUVERGER, POLITICAL PARTIES 217 (1959) (concluding that a "simplemajority single-ballot system" tends to produce a two-party system); E.E. SCHATrSCHNEIDER,
PARTY GOVERNMENT 80-84 (1942). For further refinements, see William H. Riker, The
Number of PoliticalParties:A Reexaminationof Duverger'sLaw, 9 COMP. POL. 93 (1976); William
H. Riker, The Two-Party System and Duverger's Law: An Essay on the History of PoliticalScience,
76 AM. POL. Sc. REv. 753 (1982).
59
See ANTHONY DOWNS, AN ECONOMIC THEORY OF DEMOCRACY 114-25 (1957).
60
See Stephen Ansolabehere et al., Equal Votes, Equal Money: Court-OrderedRedistricting

and Public Expenditures in the American States, 96 AM. POL. ScI. REv. 767, 776 (2002) (asserting that malapportionment "affects the distribution of funds-who gets what"); see also
Mathew D. McCubbins & Thomas Schwartz, Congress, the Courts, and Public Policy: Consequences of the One Man, One Vote Rule, 32 AM.J. POL. Sci. 388, 388 (1988) ("[T]he continuing
reallocation of federal policy benefits from rural to nonrural Americans . .. [is] a consequence of court-ordered congressional redistricting based on the One Man, One Vote
rule.").
61 369 U.S. 186 (1962).
62
Ansolabehere et al., supra note 60, at 767.
63
See id.
64
Id. at 770 ("Controlling for other factors, the estimated effect of representation on
the distribution of public policy expenditures is very large and highly significant."); McCubbins & Schwartz, supra note 60, at 409 ("[A] large-scale change in the congressional
representation of certain interests produce[s] a like change in policy.").
65
See, e.g., W. Mark Crain, Districts,Diversity, and Fiscal Biases: Evidencefrom the American
States, 42 J.L. & ECON. 675 (1999) (examining how districting affects pork barrel politics
and arguing that "the configuration of legislative districts and not merely the number of
districts matters for fiscal performance").
66
See, e.g., Donald W. Keim, Participationin ContemporaryDemocratic Theories, in PARTICIPATION IN POLITICS 1, 1 (J. Roland Pennock &John W. Chapman eds., 1975) ("The simplest
definition of democracy, rule by the people, implies participation.").
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in political decision making or to vote in elections for popular representatives." 67 As Professor Herzog intimates by equating elections
with political participation, voting is the quintessential expression of
democratic participation. 68 Similarly, the political philosopher Dennis Thompson noted recently that "[e]lections can occur without democracy, but democracy cannot endure without elections."6Y
But elections can fulfill their function only if they are not
manipulated by those who would be our governors. 70 Voters must
7
have genuine choices, and those choices must be consequential.

1

Put

72
differently, political elites cannot predetermine political outcomes.
As the Court has stated, truly democratic processes must assure that
elected officials are "the free and uncorrupted choice [s] of those who
73
have the right to take part in that choice.."

Gerrymandering subverts democratic principles by limiting the
impact of citizen choice when that choice is incompatible with the
preferences of state actors. If gerrymandering practices are taken to
their logical extreme, what is the purpose of elections? 74 When the
"fundamental institution[s] of representative democracy" 75 are controlled by self-interested political actors, these institutions' claims to
democratic legitimacy are open to severe challenge.
Political gerrymandering causes harm by distorting the fundamental democratic institutions from which the democratic process derives its legitimacy. If one takes democratic principles seriously, one
cannot permit self-interested electoral officials to apportion political
power and generate public policy outcomes based on false, self-serving criteria to the detriment of a heterogeneous society with manifold
67 HERZOG, supra note 29, at 219; see also Stephen Breyer, Our Democratic Constitution,
77 N.Y.U. L. Rsv. 245, 246 (2002) (describing "the people's right to an active and constant
participation in collective power" as an "ancient liberty").
68
See HERZOG, supra note 29, at 219; see also DANIEL HAYS LOWENSTEIN & RICHARD L.
HASEN, ELECTION LAW: CASES AND MATERIALS 29 (3d ed. 2001) ("[Vloting is the most elemental form of democratic participation.").
69
DENNIS F. THOMPSON, JUST ELECTIONS 1 (2002); see also Manin et al., supra note 26,
at 5 ("This is what is distinct about democracies: Rulers are selected through elections.").
70
PITKIN, supra note 28, at 232 ("When a ruler manipulates an inert mass of followers
to accord with his will, we hesitate to say that he represents them. In the same way, if an
interest group engages in a vast propaganda campaign to persuade the public in favor of
some measure, we do not regard this activity as representation of the public.").
71
See id.
72
See id.; MICHAEL SAWARD, THE TERMS OF DEMOCRACY 50 (1998) ("The [democratic]
requirement of effective inputs holds that inputs must determine outcomes; they must not
merely add to a sense of efficacy or belonging via political participation. Inputs must make
a difference, must be more than symbolic or tokenistic.").
73
Ex ParteYarbrough, 110 U.S. 651, 662 (1884).
74
See Samuel Issacharoff, Why Elections?, 116 HARV. L. REV. 684 (2002).
75
Kateb, supra note 31, at 357.
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In essence, extreme gerrymandering causes

harm because it inverts the democratic process, artificially constrains
voter choice, distorts election outcomes, and minimizes the legitimacy
of the democratic order. This is the true harm toward which the
Court is gesturing vigorously but an articulation of which has escaped
it with wraithlike elusiveness.
B.

No Clear Conception of Harm

To appreciate the Court's difficulty in articulating the harm, return once more to Vieth, which presented a fairly clear-cut partisan
gerrymandering claim. 77 As a consequence of population shifts reflected by the 2000 census, Pennsylvania became entitled to only
nineteen congressional representatives instead of the previous twentyone. 78 The Republicans, who held the majority in both houses and
the governor's office, controlled the redistricting process and sought
79
to maximize their partisan advantage.
The Republican Party created a classic gerrymander. They split
political subdivisions including voting precincts, counties, and cities,
drew oddly shaped districts, used irregular lines, paired Democratic
incumbents against one another, and created an open seat. 80 Conse-

quently, the Republicans secured a decisive advantage in a state that
the Democrats maintained was evenly split.8 1 The Democrats filed
suit in both state and federal court alleging political gerrymandering
under Bandeme, they lost both cases in the lower courts and did not
82
fare any better before the Supreme Court.
Vieth is remarkable in that the Court found great difficulty in
agreeing even upon the threshold question presented by the case,
which was identifying the constitutional harm caused by political gerrymandering. Justice Scalia's plurality opinion seemed indifferent to
the question of harm. While he appeared to agree with Justice John
Paul Stevens that "severe partisan gerrymander[ing is incompatible]
with democratic principles, '83 he also characterized the proposition
76
See Sanford Levinson, Gerrymanderingand the Brooding Omnipresence of Proportional
Representation: Why Won't It Go Away?, 33 UCLA L. REv. 257, 271-76 (1985) (discussing the
relationship between political structures and political values).
77
See Vieth v. Jubelirer, 541 U.S. 267 (2004).
78
See id. at 272 (plurality opinion).
79
See id. As the plurality explained in Vieth: "Prominent national figures in the Republican Party pressured the General Assembly to adopt a partisan redistricting plan as a
punitive measure against Democrats for having enacted pro-Democrat redistricting plans
elsewhere." Id.
80
See Vieth v. Pennsylvania, 195 F. Supp. 2d 672, 674 (M.D. Pa. 2002).
81
See Vieth v. Pennsylvania, 188 F. Supp. 2d 532, 536 (M.D. Pa. 2002).
82
See Vieth, 541 U.S. at 273, 305-06 (plurality opinion).
83
Id. at 292; see also id. at 293 (assuming that "an excessive injection of politics is
unlawful").

2007]

DEMOCRACY & DISTORTION

617

that there is "a judicially enforceable constitutional obligation ...not
84
to apply too much partisanship in districting" as "dubious."
Whether gerrymandering presents a constitutional harm or not, Scalia
does not believe that the Constitution has delegated to courts the task
of remedying any such harm. 8 5 Consequently, he would have dis86
missed the case on manageability grounds.
Justice Anthony Kennedy would have concluded that as the "object of districting is to establish 'fair and effective representation for
all citizens,"' 8' 7 the harm in political gerrymandering cases is to "representational rights."88 But Kennedy sought to dismiss the plaintiffs'
claims on justiciability grounds because of the "lack ...of any agreed
upon model of fair and effective representation" and the "absence of
rules to confine judicial intervention." 9
Justice Stevens argued that the constitutional harm in gerrymandering cases is "representational" at the district-level.9 0 Legislators, explained Justice Stevens, ought to be responsive to their constituents. 9 '
Drawing in particular on Shaw v. Reno, the racial gerrymandering case,
he maintained that politically gerrymandered districts "subvert that
representative norm because the winner of an election in a gerrymandered district inevitably will infer that her success is primarily attributable to the architect of the district rather than to a constituency
92
defined by neutral principles."
Like Justice Kennedy, Justice David Souter would begin with the
proposition that fairness in districting is the ultimate criterion.9 3 Unlike Justice Kennedy, however, he did not define the lack of fairness as
a problem of representational rights, but instead as "a species of vote
dilution, ' '9

4

which involves "cracking a group into impotent fractions,

to packing its members into one district for the sake of marginalizing
95
them in another."
Justice Stephen Breyer took another approach altogether. He
identified majoritarianism as the constitutional value that is vindicated

85
86

Id. at 286.
Id. at 277, 286.
Id. at 305-06.

87

Id. at 307 (Kennedy, J., concurring) (quoting Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533,

84

565-68 (1964)).
88 Id. at 308, 313.
89
Id. at 307.
90
91
92
93
94
95

Id. at 330 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
Id. at 329.
Id. at 330.
Id. at 343 (Souter, J.,
dissenting).
Id. at 354.
Id. at 343.
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by judicial review of political gerrymandering claims. 96 Justice Breyer
stated that the constitutional harm caused by political gerrymandering is the "unjustifled use of political factors to entrench a minority in
power. '9 7 He defined entrenchment to mean "that the minority's
hold on power is purely the result of partisan manipulation and not
98
other factors," such as reliance upon traditional districting criteria.
While Justice Kennedy and the dissenters took admirable steps to
articulate the harm caused by political gerrymandering, each of the
dissenting opinions mischaracterizes the full nature of that harm.
Furthermore, even if one accepts the dissenters' conceptions of the
harm on their own terms, their formulations leave much to be
desired.
Justice Stevens described the harm engendered by political gerrymandering as the fact that "the representative will perceive that the
people who put her in power are those who drew the map rather than
those who cast ballots, and she will feel beholden not to a subset of
her constituency, but to no part of her constituency at all." 99 For Justice Stevens, then, gerrymandering disrupts "representational norms"
and "imposes a [constitutionally] cognizable 'representational harm"'
by making the representative unresponsive to her constituents. 10 0
The problem with Justice Stevens's approach is that his conception of the constitutional harm is rather odd, and its principal assumptions may not bear empirical scrutiny. First, gerrymandering can
sometimes increase, rather than decrease, responsiveness.10 1 The purpose of gerrymandering is to make the challenged district-the district in which a putative plaintiff would have standing-more
responsive to the constituency selected by the gerrymander. Thus, the
kind of gerrymandering that involves redistricting-in contrast to the
silent gerrymanders of Baker v. Carr0 2 and its progeny-may actually

increase the fit between the representative and his or her constituency. In fact, that is its whole purpose.
Second, it strains credibility to assume that a rational representative even in an extremely gerrymandered district would completely ignore all of her constituents and be beholden only to those drawing the
map because a representative who abandons his or her constituency
96 See id. at 356 (Breyer, J., dissenting) ("There must also be a method for transforming the will of the majority into effective government.").
97
98

Id. at 360.
Id.

99

Id. at 331 (Stevens, J., dissenting).

100

Id. at 329-30.

See Andrew Gelman & Gary King, Enhancing Democracy Through Legislative Redistricting, 88 AM. POL. Sci. REV. 541, 550, 553 (1994).
102 See 369 U.S. 186, 187-88 (1962).
101
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will lose.' 0 3 In such a case, it is apparent that the political process is
working as it should, 1° 4 thus leaving no constitutional value for judicial review to vindicate.
Justice Stevens's construction of the harm is odd in a third respect. If there is a group of voters that should concernJustice Stevens,
it is the "filler people" in an extremely gerrymandered district.1"5 Filler people are voters whose presence in a district is intended solely to
satisfy the mandate of the Court's requirement that all districts have
the same population and not to affect the preordained outcome. 0 6
Thus, state actors specifically designate filler people as political
losers.10 7 As the ones least likely to be protected by the political process, filler people are arguably the object of the Court's concern in
Shaw. 08s If anyone has a claim to misrepresentation, it is the filler
09
people-the district's political minority-not the district's majority.
Thus, for all of the reasons noted above, Justice Stevens's construction
is puzzling at best.
Justice Souter's conception is similarly flawed, as he would define
the harm as vote dilution at the district level. 110 Under this concep103
Political scientists who study Congress have repeatedly found that the care and handling of constituents is the key focus for a representative during her tenure in office.
David Mayhew has gone so far as to describe members of Congress as "single-minded seekers of reelection." DAVID R. MAYHEW, CONGRESS: THE ELECTORAL CONNECTION 5 (1974).

Richard Fenno has shown how members' attention and behavior focus on building and
maintaining electoral support within their districts for purposes of their re-election campaigns. See RICHARD F. FENNO, JR., HOME STYLE: HOUSE MEMBERS IN THEIR DISTRICTS 33
(1978). Even those members who hold what some might consider "safe" seats dedicate
time and resources to constituent service. See id. As other scholars have explained, this is
most likely because representatives tend "to overestimate their visibility to the local public"
when considering whether their official actions could lead to electoral sanction. Warren E.
Miller & Donald E. Stokes, Constituency Influence in Congress, 57 Am. POL. ScI. REV. 45, 54
(1963).
104 As Justice Scalia noted in Vieth: "We dare say (and hope) that the political party
which puts forward an utterly incompetent candidate will lose even in its registration
stronghold." 541 U.S. at 287 (plurality opinion).
105
T. Alexander Aleinikoff & Samuel Issacharoff, Race and Redistricting: Drawing Constitutional Lines After Shaw v. Reno, 92 MICH. L. REV. 588, 601 (1993).
106
107

See id. at 631.
See id. at 601.

108 509 U.S. 630, 648 (1993) ("When a district obviously is created solely to effectuate
the perceived common interests of one racial group, elected officials are more likely to
believe that their primary obligation is to represent only the members of that group, rather
than their constituency as a whole."); see also Aleinikoff & Issacharoff, supra note 105, at 631
("Indeed, it is in the name of the filler people that the Court ultimately reacted in Shaw.").
109 Recognizing the effect that gerrymandering has on a district's political minority, in
his Vieth dissent, Justice Stevens maintained that "[g]errymandering always involves the
drawing of district boundaries to maximize the voting strength of the dominant political
faction and to minimize the strength of one or more groups of opponents." 541 U.S. at
335 (Stevens, J., dissenting). But he did not choose to define the state's intentional designation of a political group as preordained political losers as the harm caused by political
gerrymandering.
110 See id. at 354 (Souter, J., dissenting).
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tion, the inquiry would be whether "each political group in a State
[has] the same chance to elect representatives of its choice as any
other political group."'' There are two central and related problems
with Justice Souter's approach. First, as some commentators have
noted, one cannot assess vote dilution by simply examining a single
district because one needs a statewide baseline to provide a rough
sense of what a political group's strength ought to be.' 12 Second, and
more fatally, as we have previously examined, political outcomes can
be both exogenous and endogenous. 113 That is, political outcomes
can be the result of fixed voter preferences or political outcomes can
be shaped by the political environment.1 14 Exogenous political outcomes mean that citizens have fairly fixed preferences that political
institutions can register or aggregate.' 15 Endogenous outcomes imply
that citizen preferences significantly depend upon political context' 16
and, as a result, changing the political context, in turn, changes the
outcome.' 17 Thus, from the point of endogeneity, citizens do not
have real preferences-preferences outside of their political electoral
contexts.118

The problem with Justice Souter's conception of the harm is that
he assumes we are in a political world in which political outcomes are
only exogenous. 19 In such a world, no baseline problem exists because citizens have true preferences against which to measure political
outcomes. 12° However, in a world where citizen preferences are endogenous, it is senseless to talk about what political outcomes should
be because political outcomes can only be what they turn out to be. 12
Id. at 343 (quoting Davis v. Bandemer, 478 U.S. 109, 124 (1986)).
112 See, e.g., Heather K. Gerken, Lost in the Political Thicket: The Court, Election Law, and
the DoctrinalInterregnum, 153 U. PA. L. REV. 503, 510 (2004).
113
See Mettler & Soss, supra note 50.
114 SeeJames H. Kuklinksi & Gary M. Segura, Endogeneity, Exogeneity, Time, and Space in
PoliticalRepresentation, 20 LEGIS. STUD. Q. 3 (1995); Mettler & Soss, supra note 50.
111

115

See ANGUS CAMPBELL, PHILIP E. CONVERSE, WARREN E. MILLER & DONALD E. STOKES,

121 (1960).
116 SeeJackson, supra note 42.
117 For a theoretical application of this principle, see Daniel H. Lowenstein &
Jonathan Steinberg, The Questfor LegislativeDistrictingin the Public Interest: Elusive or Illusory,
33 UCLA L. REV. 1, 60 (1985) ("If districts change, the candidates change, their strengths
and weaknesses change, their campaigns change, their ability to raise money changes, the
issues change-everything changes."). For a very innovative empirical application, see
David T. Canon et al., The Supply Side of CongressionalRedistricting: Race and Strategic Politicians 1972-1992, 58J. POL. 846 (1996).
118 See Gerber & Jackson, supra note 42, at 639.
119 See Vieth v. Jubelirer, 541 U.S. 267, 343 (2004) (Souter, J., dissenting).
120
See Gerber &Jackson, supra note 42, at 639 (describing exogenous preferences as
fixed individual preferences). If preferences are fixed, one may predict the voting outcome of an election in a district based on members' political parties. See id.
121 This point is aptly advanced by Larry Alexander. As he stated, assuming a world "in
which majorities shift depending upon the issue or personality under consideration [,] ...
the concept of vote dilution becomes indeterminate." See Alexander, supra note 20, at 571.
THE AMERICAN VOTER
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Thus, even if Justice Souter were to try to assess dilution by looking at
a state as a whole, the baseline problem would only become a more
22
pressing issue.1
Justice Breyer's opinion in which he characterizes the harm as
minority entrenchment is similarly disappointing. The problem with
his opinion is that majoritarianism is not the constitutional value that
political gerrymandering offends. As the Court in Bandemer recognized, political gerrymandering and malapportionment are two different problems. 23 Majoritarianism was the constitutional value
vindicated by Baker and its progeny. 12 4 In those cases, such as Reynolds
v. Sims, a minority successfully defied the will of a majority of voters by
manipulating institutional structures of representation in order to artificially maintain its hold on political power. 25 It is thus not surprising that Justice Breyer cited Reynolds to support his conception of the
constitutional harm that political gerrymandering inflicts. 12 6
Admittedly, political gerrymandering claims are often couched in
majoritarian tones. However, framing political gerrymandering
claims as a problem with entrenchment by political minorities is misleading and unhelpful. As both Bandemer and Vieth illustrate, the
problem of political gerrymandering is not necessarily that of minority
entrenchment. 127 The goal of gerrymandering is to manipulate electoral structures in order to maximize the political power of the party
that controls the redistricting process while concomitantly minimizing
the political power of the other party. 28 Outside of the malapportionment context, terms such as majority, minority, and entrenchment are not very useful. In Bandemer, the controlling Republican
Party received 48% of the vote for the Indiana House of Representatives but translated that support into 57% of the seats.' 29 Under the
structures challenged in Vieth, the Republican Party, which controlled
the districting process, acquired twelve congressional district seats out
of nineteen in a state in which only 41% of the voters were registered
Republicans and 51% of the voters voted for Al Gore in the 2000 pres122
This Article does not identify competition as the harm of political gerrymandering
for precisely this reason. We do not know what the appropriate level of competition ought
to be, even if we look at the state as a whole. In infra Parts IV and V, I suggest how we
might resolve the endogeneity-exogeneity problem.
123
See 478 U.S. 109, 131-32 (1986) (plurality opinion).
124
Charles, supra note 26, at 1146-48.
125
See Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 565, 570 (1964).
126
Vieth v. Jubelirer, 541 U.S. 267, 360-61 (2004) (Breyer, J., dissenting).
127
See id. at 297 (plurality opinion) (asserting thatJustice Souter's argument that the
harm is "vote dilution" fails to look at the "electoral success, the electoral opportunity, or
even the political influence" that characterize gerrymanders); Bandemer,478 U.S. at 131-32
(plurality opinion).
128
See Vieth, 541 U.S. at 274 (plurality opinion).
129
See Bandemer, 478 U.S. at 115 (plurality opinion).
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idential election.'3 0 Are the Republicans a minority in Pennsylvania?
Until recently, both of the state's U.S. Senators were Republicans and
"[s]ince 1955 the two major parties have alternated in the governor's
office every eight years." 131 The current governor is a Democrat and
was preceded by a Republican.' 3 2 It is thus not clear that either
Bandemer or Vieth-or any modern political gerrymandering case for
that matter-seriously raises the problem of minority entrenchment.
Consequently, Justice Breyer's approach is also unavailing.
tII
RACE AND POLITICS

The Court's struggles with articulating the harm of extreme political gerrymandering have led to an argument among commentators
and the Justices themselves regarding whether the federal courts have
anything to contribute to resolving the problem. While this argument
has centered on terms of race and politics-whether the race cases
can serve as an adjudicatory guide for the political cases-it is really
an argument about rights and structures, specifically, whether structural political claims are justiciable.
A.

Background

In the conventional rendering of election law claims, the purpose
of judicial review is to vindicate individual rights. 133 As Professors
Lowenstein and Steinberg have stated, this is because "intervention in
the political system by the Court in the name of individual rights has a
presumptive legitimacy in the American tradition."1 34 This individualist account presupposes that courts deploy judicial review to protect
individual autonomy or individual choice and that individual rights
trump competing state interests.1 35 Standing is conferred as a consequence of personal injury suffered by the plaintiff.1 36 Additionally,
130

See MICHAEL

BARONE ET AL., THE ALMANAC OF AMERICAN POLITICS

2004, at 1349-50

(2003).
131
132

Id. at 1348, 1352.
See id. at 1352-53. The current governor is Ed Rendell, a Democrat. The previous

governor was Tom Ridge, a Republican. See id. at 1352-53.
133
See, e.g., RiCHARD L. HASEN, THE SUPREME COURT AND ELECTION LAW: JUDGING
EQUALITY FROM BAKER V. CARR TO BUSH V. GORE 139 (2003); Lowenstein & Steinberg, supra
note 117, at 15. For a more extensive introduction, see Charles, Politics, supra note 16, at
1113-20 (detailing the genesis of the debate); Heather K. Gerken, supra note 112, at 507
n.19 (describing different issues that are relevant to the debate).
134
Lowenstein & Steinberg, supra note 117, at 15.
135
See Samuel Issacharoff, Groups and the Right to Vote, 44 EMORY L.J. 869, 882-84
(1995); Pildes, supra note 10.
136
See Issacharoff & Pildes, supra note 9, at 645 (noting that standing is traditionally
based on "individualistic conceptions of harm").
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the injury and the remedy are both conceived of in individualist
terms.
By contrast, a competing account in law and politics is that election law claims are structural and necessarily so. 13 7 Structuralism refers to a methodological concept of constitutional interpretation and
the teleological orientation of that methodology. More specifically,
for the purposes of this Article, structuralism is (a) the "method of
inferring constitutional principles . . .from the overall structure" of
the Constitution "without clear guidance from the text"'138 for (b) the
purposes of regulating "the institutional arrangements within which
politics is conducted" as opposed to protecting individual or personal
rights.' 39 For structuralists, election law claims concern the proper
relationship among democratic institutions; structuralists contend
that the proper role of judicial review is to assure that democratic institutions reflect democratic values.' 40 Richard Pildes, a leading structuralist, maintained that the 'justification for judicial review itself
entails . . . that courts address structural problems and enforce structural values concerning the democratic order as a whole." 14 1 Structuralism focuses on the manner in which electoral "rules advantage
and disadvantage different types of institutional players relative to
each other, and how the rules change incentives for various types of
political behavior." 142 With respect to standing in the structural conception, the plaintiff is truly "standing in for and representing the
1 43
structural values" that are allegedly undermined by the state.
Unlike any other election law issue, the battle over the justiciability of political gerrymandering claims has forced the Court and
commentators to confront the extent to which election law claims are
truly structural and, if truly structural, the extent to which the federal
courts can successfully adjudicate those claims in election law. On
one side of the debate are the individualists, Justices and commentators who argue that political gerrymandering claims do not implicate
any constitutionally relevant individual rights and are therefore not
See Gerken, supra note 112, at 507.
Laurence H. Tribe, Saenz Sans Prophecy: Does the Privileges or Immunities Revival Portend the Future-OrReveal the Structure of the Present?, 113 HARV. L. REV. 110, 137 (1999).
139
Pamela S. Karlan, Nothing Personal: The Evolution of the Newest Equal Protectionfrom
Shaw v. Reno to Bush v. Gore, 79 N.C. L. REV. 1345, 1346 (2001). This Article focuses on
the teleological concept of structuralism rather than the methodological concept. However, the methodological concept is a necessary background against which the teleological
concept is understood. Later works, however, shall return more explicitly to the methodological concept. For a methodological defense of structuralism as such, see Richard H.
Pildes, The Constitution and Political Competition, 30 NovA L. REV. 253 (2006).
140
See, e.g.,
Daniel R. Ortiz, From Rights to Arrangements, 32 Lo'. L.A. L. REV. 1217, 1218
(1999); Pildes, supra note 15, at 44.
141
Pildes, supra note 15, at 44.
142
Ortiz, supra note 140, at 1218.
143 Charles, Politics, supra note 16, at 1117.
137
138
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justiciable. 144 Individualists find fault with structuralism for privileging the Court's theory of democracy over those of duly elected officials, 145 thereby leading to greater judicial involvement in the political
process. 146 Professor Richard Hasen, a leading individualist, has argued that structuralism's principle weakness is its requirement that
courts make contested normative judgments that they are incapable of
making.

14 7

Structuralists, however, contend that an individual rights frame48
work "does not fully capture what is at stake" in election law claims. 1
For example, under the structuralist conception, an individual rights
framework fails to acknowledge that politics involves the aggregation
and mobilization of interest groups that influence the political process. 149 An individual rights framework also misconceives the constitutional harm and leads to greater judicial intrusion into the political
process. 150 Because election law claims are essentially structural,
courts cannot resolve these claims using an individual rights
framework.

51

For the most part, the pro-justiciability Justices have accepted the
implicit assumption of the argument against structuralism that vindicating individual rights as opposed to structural values is a more legitimate exercise of judicial review.1 52 Consequently, they have tried to
See, e.g., Lowenstein & Steinberg, supra note 117, at 12-15.
See, e.g., Cain, supra note 11, at 1600 (criticizing the structural approach on the
ground that it would "limit the polity's freedom to adopt forms of government and representation that are most appropriate for its needs").
146
See, e.g., id. ("The structural approach leads inevitably to intrusive judicial involvement in states' political arrangements."); Daniel H. Lowenstein, The Supreme Court Has No
Theory of Politics-And Be Thankful for Small Favors, in THE U.S. SUPREME COURT AND THE
ELECTORAL PROCEss 245, 264 (David K. Ryden ed., 2000).
147
See HASEN, supra note 133, at 154; see also Luis Fuentes-Rohwer, Doing OurPolitics in
Court: Gerymandering "FairRepresentation" and an Exegesis into the Judicial Role, 78 NOTRE
DAME L. REv. 527, 538 (2003) ("When courts intervene, they simply take sides in highly
politicized debates. They do very little else.").
148
Gerken, supra note 112, at 507; see also Issacharoff & Pildes, supra note 9, at 645
(noting that an individual rights framework "is too narrow to capture the range of considerations the courts actually take into account").
149
Heather K. Gerken, Understandingthe Right to an Undiluted Vote, 114 HARv. L. REv.
1663, 1681 (2000) (defining vote dilution as an aggregate harm that cannot be understood
properly from an individual rights perspective); Issacharoff, supra note 135, at 884 (noting
that the "rhetoric of rights" is not "well-suited to group-based claims" but that "the right to
effective voting is incomprehensible without that conception of the group"); Issacharoff &
Pildes, supra note 9, at 645 ("[T]he focus on rights poorly explains the nature of vote
dilution claims, in which individuals can only show harm as part of an aggregate entity.");
Pildes, supra note 15, at 53 ("[P]olitics involves, at its core, the organization and mobilization of groups and coalitions for effective concerted action.").
150
See, e.g., Issacharoff, supra note 4, at 611; Issacharoff & Karlan, supra note 17, at 575.
151
See, e.g., Charles, Politics, supra note 16, at 1124; Issacharoff, supra note 4, at 609.
152
See Charles, Politics, supra note 16, at 1123 ("[T]he individual rights-structure distinction simply becomes an element of the Court's justiciability doctrine: Individual rights
claims are justiciable and structural claims are nonjusticiable.").
144

145
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fit their conception of the constitutional harm within the individualist
frame. In particular, they have naturally gravitated to the racial dilution cases in which the Court has long addressed and domesticated
the structural difficulties of adjudicating political process claims.' 53
Moreover, for individualists (and also structuralists), the quintessential example of legitimate judicial review of democratic politics is the
involvement by the federal courts in the democratic process to guard
against racial discrimination in electoral politics.'

54

But race in this context is a fallible guide. 55 To provide some
context for this point and to better understand why race is even considered a potential aid in these cases for resolving political disputes,
one has to understand the debate concerning the relevance of race to
political gerrymandering claims as part of a long-running dispute on
the usefulness of race as an appropriate model for directing judicial
supervision of the democratic process. Part II.B explores the contours
of this debate with particular emphasis on the arguments of the Justices who viewed race as an exception to judicial involvement in politics. Part II.C explains why the distinction between race and politics
collapsed, which helps us to understand why race was germane in
Bandemer and in Vieth and why it continues to influence the debate
over the justiciability of political gerrymandering claims.
B.

The Race-Politics Distinction
An apt place to begin is with Giles v. Haris,156 a case that estab-

lished the principle that it is not the role of the courts to provide relief
153
See, e.g., Easley v. Cromartie, 532 U.S. 234 (2001); Bush v. Vera, 517 U.S. 952
(1996); Miller v. Johnson, 515 U.S. 900 (1995); Shaw v. Reno, 509 U.S. 630 (1993).
154
See Richard Briffault, Race and Representation After Miller v. Johnson, 1995 U. CHI.
LEGAL F. 23, 23 (noting that the Supreme Court has been examining the role of race in
vote dilution for the past three decades).
155
In a recent and extremely thoughtful article, Professor Terry Smith explored the
harm to voters of color when the Court combines its jurisprudence on race and politics.
See Terry Smith, Autonomy Versus Equality: Voting Rights Rediscovered, 57 At-A. L. REv. 261
(2005). Professor Smith explains:
The Supreme Court and lower courts have systematically over-determined
race when minority control is at stake by failing to demarcate the boundaries of racial classifications from political classifications. When race is overdetermined, the goal of eliminating it becomes elusive. Conversely, courts
have treated race as a proxy for partisanship when doing so has facilitated
curtailing minority political autonomy. Similarly, the Supreme Court engages in racially correlative doctrinal shifts in defining the nature of the
right to vote and in implementing that right, finding voting to be a fundamental right when the interests of whites are at stake, but insisting on a
showing of racially discriminatory intent when the plaintiffs are people of
color. The ironic effect of this doctrinal inconsistency is to gratuitously
racialize equal protection doctrine and, in the process, politics itself.
Id. at 264.
156
189 U.S. 475 (1903).
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for political-structural-claims. 157 The plaintiff in Giles, an African
American citizen in Alabama, filed suit on behalf of over five thousand African Americans. 158 The plaintiff objected to the state's effort
to disenfranchise them and all African American citizens of Alabama.' 59 The plaintiff asked for a declaration that the discriminatory
disenfranchising scheme was void, and he sought to have all qualified
members of his race added to the voting lists.

160

Writing for the

Court, Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr. stated that it is "impossible"
for the Court to grant the plaintiff equitable relief because "the traditional limits of proceedings in equity have not embraced a remedy for
political wrongs.'

6

' Justice Holmes intimated that the role of the

Court is to provide relief from individual harm; apart from that, "relief from a great political wrong, if done, as alleged, by the people of a
State and the State itself, must be given by them or by the legislative
162
and political department of the government of the United States."
Holmes's Giles opinion is relevant for our purposes because in it
he framed the case, which alleged racial discrimination in the political
process, as being about political rights as opposed to race. Holmes
then suggested that political rights cases are not justiciable and that
the political process itself must supply the remedy to political
wrongs. 1 63 If race cases are truly political rights cases, and political
rights cases are not justiciable, then Giles clearly imports that claims
alleging racial discrimination in the political process are also
nonjusticiable.
This was precisely the argument that the defendants advanced in
Nixon v. Herndon.164 However, in Nixon, Holmes, again writing for the
Court, prosaically struck down Texas's attempt to prohibit African
American voters from voting in the democratic primary. 165 When the
defendants essentially argued Giles, Holmes summarily retorted that
the "objection that the subject-matter of the suit is political is little
more than a play upon words.'

66

Conceding that the "petition con-

action," 16 7

Holmes distinguished Nixon from Giles on
cerns political
the ground that the plaintiffs in Nixon sought to recover for private
157 For the structural and individual rights dimensions of Giles, see Charles, Politics,
supra note 16, at 1121-23.
See Giles, 189 U.S. at 482.
158
159
See id. at 482-84.
See id. at 482.
160
161
Id. at 486.
162
Id. at 488.
163
See id.
273 U.S. 536 (1927).
164
165
See id. at 540-41 (explaining that Texas's statute cannot be sustained because it
violates the Fourteenth Amendment).
166
Id. at 540.
167
Id.
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damage' 6 : "That private damage may be caused by such political action and may be recovered for in a suit at law hardly has been doubted
169
for over two hundred years."

But this law-equity distinction is not entirely persuasive. As Professor Pildes has noted, though Justice Holmes in Giles did not foreclose the possibility that an action for damages would be successful,
"no court ever acted on that option."' 17 1 In fact, Giles himself filed an
action for damages, but to no avail. 171 Moreover, the fact the defendants in Nixon could argue in good faith that race discrimination claims
in the political process were nonjusticiable political rights more than
two full decades after Giles may be indicative of the fact that the issue
1 72
was not as settled as Holmes made it out to be in Nixon.
Indeed, the issue of whether race discrimination claims in the
political process are nonjusticiable political rights was pressed again in
the 1939 case of Lane v. Wilson, 7 3 addressing an attempt by Oklahoma
to prevent African American voters from registering to vote. 174 The
plaintiffs argued that Oklahoma's discriminatory registration scheme
violated the Fifteenth Amendment.1 75 The defendants, like those in
Nixon, made a Giles argument. This time Justice Felix Frankfurter, writing for the Court, offered two grounds for distinguishing Giles. First,
Frankfurter reiterated Holmes's explication in Nixon: Giles was a case
about the limitations of equitable claims, whereas Lane was an action
at law. 176 Second, Frankfurter offered a distinctive and significant justification for distinguishing the two cases: The plaintiff in Lane, unlike
1 77
the plaintiff in Giles, was not alleging a "denial of the right to vote. 1
Rather, the plaintiff in Lane, like the plaintiff in Nixon, was alleging a
right to be free from racial discrimination, which is protected by the
78
Fifteenth Amendment (and Nixon).1
168

Id.

169

Id.

170

Richard H. Pildes, Keeping Legal History Meaningful, 19 CONST. COMMENT. 645, 648
n.7 (2002).
171
See Richard H. Pildes, Democracy, Anti-Democracy, and the Canon, 17 CoNrsT. COMMENT.

295, 308 (2000).

See Nixon, 273 U.S. at 540.
307 U.S. 268 (1939).
174
See id. at 269-71; see also Guinn v. United States, 238 U.S. 347 (1915) (challenging
an amendment to the Oklahoma Constitution requiring citizens to pass a literacy test in
order to vote).
175
See Lane, 307 U.S. at 269.
176
See id. at 272-73.
177
Id. at 274; see also Giles v. Harris, 189 U.S. 475, 482 (1903) (describing the plaintiffs
cause of action). In addition, Frankfurter noted that the plaintiff in Giles asked for specific
performance, which the Court could not provide since he was also claiming that the registration scheme was unconstitutional. See Lane, 307 U.S. at 272-73.
178
See Lane, 307 U.S. at 274 ("The Fifteenth Amendment secures freedom from discrimination on account of race in matters affecting the franchise."); see also Nixon v.
172
173
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Lane is thus significant for two reasons. First, it not only confirmed that cases alleging racial discrimination in the political process
were justiciable-a task substantially performed by Nixon-but it also
provided ajustification for treating race cases differently: viz., the text
of the Fifteenth Amendment explicitly prohibits racial discrimination
in the political process.1 79 Second, in modifying the Giles framework,
Justice Frankfurter in Lane firmly established the race-politics distinction. The Court has a responsibility to address claims of racial discrimination in the political process, but no responsibility to claims of
political discrimination. 180
The race-politics distinction is useful to explain the Court's decisions in Colegrove v. Green'8 ' and Gomillion v. Lightfoot.18 2 In Colegrove,
Justice Frankfurter deployed Holmes's reasoning in Giles as he had
refined it in Lane to dismiss a suit challenging Illinois's malapportioned congressional districts. 183 Concluding that malapportionment
suits are nonjusticiable, Justice Frankfurter remarked that the Court
was being asked to resolve a dispute that was "of a peculiarly political
nature and therefore not meet for judicial determination."18

4

The

Court professed that its role was to decide cases involving individual
rights as opposed to disputes involving the structure of the political
process.18 5 Echoing Holmes, Frankfurter maintained that "[t]he Constitution has left the performance of many duties in our governmental
scheme to depend on the fidelity of the executive and legislative action and, ultimately, on the vigilance of the people in exercising their
18
political rights."

6

In Gomillion, the State argued that the plaintiffs' claim was a redistricting or apportionment claim and thus not justiciable in light of
Colegrove.187 Writing for the Court, Justice Frankfurter disagreed
strongly. 18 8 Colegrove,Justice Frankfurter stated, "involved a complaint
Herndon, 273 U.S. 536, 540 (1927) (discussing the plaintiff's argument that a statute that
discriminates on the basis of race violates the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments).
179 See U.S. CONST. amend. XV, § 1 ("The right of citizens of the United States to vote
shall not be denied or abridged by the United States or by any State on account of race,
color, or previous condition of servitude."); Lane, 307 U.S. at 274.
180 This distinction guided the Court's political process inquiry for over two decadesuntil Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186 (1962). See infra Part II.C.
181
328 U.S. 549 (1946).
182 364 U.S. 339 (1960).
183 See 328 U.S. at 550-51.
184

Id. at 552.

185 See id. ("The basis for the suit is not a private wrong, but a wrong suffered by Illinois
as a polity.").
186

Id. at 556.

187
Gomillion, 364 U.S. at 346.
188 See id. ("The decisive facts in this case ...
tions found controlling in Colegrove.").

are wholly different from the considera-
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of discriminatory apportionment of congressional districts" and political vote dilution. 1 9 By contrast, in Gomillion, as Frankfurter notes:
The petitioners here complain that affirmative legislative action deprives them of their votes and the consequent advantages that the
ballot affords. When a legislature thus singles out a readily isolated
segment of a racial minority for special discriminatory treatment, it
violates the Fifteenth Amendment. In no case involving unequal
weight in voting distribution that has come before the Court did the
decision sanction a differentiation on racial lines whereby approval
was given to unequivocal withdrawal of the vote solely from colored
citizens. Apart from all else, these considerations lift this controversy out of the so-called "political" arena and into the conventional
sphere of constitutional litigation.1 9 0
Furthermore, citing Holmes in Nixon and amplifying his own reasoning in Lane, Frankfurter noted that while the subject of the suit
may be political, that categorization was immaterial.' 9 1 "While in
form this is merely an act redefining metes and bounds, if the allegations are established, the inescapable human effect of this essay in
geometry and geography is to despoil colored citizens, and only
colored citizens, of their theretofore enjoyed voting rights. That was
not Colegrove v. Green." 192 Colegrove, Frankfurter argued, was a case in
which the state "exercise[d] power wholly within the domain of [its]
interest."'19 3 Consequently, the state's action was justifiably "insulated
from federal judicial review."' 19 4 By contrast-recall here Lane-in
Gomillion, "state power [was] used as an instrument for circumventing
a federally protected right,"'195 which is safeguarded by the Fifteenth
Amendment. 19 6 Accordingly, the insulation of state action that ap189
190

Id.

Id. at 346-47. Frankfurter's concern for cabining the justiciability of vote dilution
claims to contexts involving racial vote dilution thus explains his characterization of the
plaintiffs' claim not as "an ordinary geographic redistricting measure within familiar
abuses of gerrymandering." Id. at 341. Rather, Frankfurter described the claim as "tantamount for all practical purposes to a mathematical demonstration, that the legislation is
solely concerned with segregating white and colored voters by fencing Negro citizens out
of town so as to deprive them of their pre-existing municipal vote." Id.
191 See id.at 347.
Id.
192
193 Id.
194
Id.
195 Id.
196 See id.at 342. Explicitly relying upon Lane,Frankfurter maintained that the allegations implicated the Fifteenth Amendment, which "nullifies sophisticated as well as simpleminded modes of discrimination." Id. The race-politics distinction may explain why
Frankfurter relied upon the Fifteenth Amendment in Gomillion, notwithstanding the pathdependence of Lane as precedent for the Fifteenth Amendment. Having committed to the
proposition that the Court cannot adjudicate political rights because the Constitution does
not address those problems, Frankfurter may have regarded the Fifteenth Amendment,
which explicitly forbids denial of the franchise on the basis of race, as the best guardian of
that principle. While the Fourteenth Amendment may have been equally applicable in
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plied in the political rights context could not be "carried over" into
9 7

the racial context.1

The race-politics distinction is also useful to explain the Court's
decisions in Whitcomb v. Chavis'9 8 and White v. Regester.199 In Whitcomb,
African American plaintiffs residing in Marion County, Indiana challenged a redistricting plan for the Indiana legislative assembly alleging
racial vote dilution, a consequence of the plan's multimember districts. 20 0 From the Court's perspective, the fundamental question in

Whitcomb was whether the plaintiffs were Democrats who were victims
of the natural vagaries of the political process and happened to be
African American or whether they were victims of intentional, invidious, racial discrimination who happened to be Democrats. 20 1 In an
opinion by Justice Byron Raymond White, the Court rejected the
plaintiffs' challenge on the ground that they had failed to prove that
they "had less opportunity than did [white] Marion County residents
to participate in the political processes and to elect legislators of their
choice." 20 2 The Court defined "less opportunity.., to participate" as
an inability to register, vote, or choose the political party of one's
choice; exclusion from party governance; racial discrimination in the
nomination of candidates; and racial discrimination in representation. 20 3 Having noted that the multimember districts did not deprive
the plaintiffs of an opportunity to participate in state politics as determined by the Court's process-centric definition, the Court dismissed
20 4
the plaintiffs as mere political process losers.
For Justice White and the majority, Whitcomb was not a case about
race, but instead a case about politics. Justice White intimated that if
the plaintiffs were victims of racial discrimination in the political process, the Court would be compelled to vindicate their political rights
because the Court bears a special responsibility for protecting voters
Gomillion, as Justice Charles Evans Whitaker articulated in his concurrence to that decision
and Justice O'Connor reinforced in Shaw v. Reno, Frankfurter may have rightfully perceived that reliance on the Fourteenth Amendment would inevitably enmesh the Court in
the "political thicket." See Colegrove v. Green, 328 U.S. 549, 556 (1946).
197
See Gomillion, 364 U.S. at 347.
198 403 U.S. 124 (1971).
199 412 U.S. 755 (1973).
200
See Whitcomb, 403 U.S. at 128-29.
201
See id. at 154 ("But are poor Negroes of the ghetto any more underrepresented
than poor ghetto whites who also voted Democratic and lost, or any more discriminated
against than other interest groups or voters in Marion County with allegiance to the Democratic Party ... ?").
202
Id. at 149.
203

Id. at 149-50.

See id. at 153 ("The voting power of [the plaintiffs] may have been 'cancelled out'
as the District Court held, but this seems a mere euphemism for political defeat at the
polls.").
204
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of color against racial discrimination..2 0 5 However, Justice White con-

cluded that there was no such evidence 20 6: The plaintiffs in Whitcomb
experienced the political process as Democrats, and not as African
20 7
Americans.
However, in White v. Regester,Justice White, writing for the Court,
held that the use of multimember districts in certain counties in Texas
constituted racial vote dilution. 20 8 The Court concluded that the
plaintiffs, African Americans and Mexican Americans, "had less opportunity than did other residents . . .to participate in the political

processes and to elect legislators of their choice." 20 9 The Court relied
upon evidence showing a "history of official racial discrimination in
Texas" that prevented the plaintiffs from registering, voting, and "participat[ing] in the political processes." 2 10 Moreover, the County, as
part of a one-party state, "did not need the support of the Negro community to win elections in the county, and it did not therefore exhibit
good-faith concern for the political and other needs and aspirations
of the Negro community." 2 11 The Court also went on to note some
structural features of Texas's electoral structures that "enhanced the
2 12
opportunity for racial discrimination."
C.

Race as a Model for Politics

As committed as the Court (and Justice Frankfurter in particular)
was to the race-politics distinction, it proved fragile and difficult to
sustain. An important weakness became evident in 1944 in the lesserknown case of Snowden v. Hughes.213 Joseph E.Snowden was a Republican primary candidate for the state legislature. 2 14 Under the state's
partisan proportional representation scheme, the Republicans were to
2 15
nominate two candidates and the Democrats were to nominate one.

After tabulating the votes, the county canvassing board certified that
Snowden received the second-highest number of votes in the Republi205
See id. at 149 ("[I]t needs no emphasis here that the Civil War Amendments were
designed to protect the civil rights of Negroes and that the courts have been vigilant in
scrutinizing schemes allegedly conceived or operated as purposeful devices to further racial discrimination.").
206 See id. (" [T] here is no suggestion here that Marion County's multi-member district,
or similar districts throughout the State, were conceived or operated as purposeful devices
to further racial or economic discrimination.").
207 See id. at 153-55.
208
See 412 U.S. 755, 765-67 (1973).
209

See id. at 766.

210

Id.

211

Id. at 767.

212

Id. at 766-67.

213

321 U.S. 1 (1944).

214

See id. at 3.

215

See id.
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can primary. 2 16 Snowden argued that under Illinois law, he should
have been one of the two Republican candidates on the ballot, which
would have guaranteed his election to the state legislature as a state
21 7
representative under this proportional representation scheme.
However, even though it had certified the results, the state canvassing
board refused to place Snowden's name on the ballot.21 8

Snowden

filed suit alleging that the board's refusal to place him on the ballot
2 19
violated the Fourteenth Amendment.
In a rather laborious and poorly reasoned opinion by Justice
Harlan Fiske Stone, the Court affirmed the dismissal of Snowden's
complaint on the ground that Snowden failed to adequately plead
that the state acted with purposeful discrimination. 220 But, as Justice
William 0. Douglas correctly stated in his dissenting opinion:
[The complaint] charge [d] a conspiracy to willfully, maliciously and
arbitrarily refuse to designate him as one of the nominees of the
Republican party, that such action was an "unequal" administration
of the Illinois law and a denial to him of the equal protection of the
22 1
laws, and that the conspiracy had that purpose.
Even Justice Frankfurter, who concurred in the majority opinion, admitted that the majority's reading of the plaintiff's complaint as insufficiently pled was "constrained." 222 He explained the Court's limited
reading of the complaint as "reflect[ing] the most exacting attitude
against drawing into the federal courts controversies over state elections." 223 In fact, the Court stated that "[i] t was not intended by the
Fourteenth Amendment and the Civil Rights Acts that all matters formerly within the exclusive cognizance of the states should become
matters of national concern."224 Yet, the Court refused to take the
easy way out, and citing the White Primary cases in particular, stated
that "[w] here discrimination is sufficiently shown, the right to relief
216
See id. The Republican candidate receiving the highest number of votes, incumbent A. Andrew Torrence, was killed the day before the primary by a disgruntled former
employee. See Illinois Legislator Slain in His Office, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 9, 1940, at 18. Snowden
likely assumed that, as the Republican candidate who received the next highest number of
votes, he was entitled to the nomination. See Snowden, 321 U.S. at 4. Instead, the canvassing board declared a vacancy and named someone else to replace Torrence. See id.
217
See Snowden, 321 U.S. at 3.
218
See id. at 3-4.

See id. at 2.
See id. at 7 ("There is no allegation [in the complaint] of any facts tending to show
that in refusing to certify petitioner as a nominee, the Board was making any intentional or
purposeful discrimination between persons or classes.").
221
Id. at 18 (Douglas, J., dissenting).
222
Id. at 14 (Frankfurter, J., concurring).
219
220

223

Id.

224

Id. at 11.
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under the equal protection clause is not diminished by the fact that
225
the discrimination relates to political rights."
From this perspective, the Court's decision in Baker v. Carr not
only settled a dispute regarding the justiciability of political rights
cases, but it also attempted to settle one about the relevance of
race. 22 6 For the Court to justify its conclusion that malapportioned
districts, which some have referred to as silent gerrymanders, 2 27 were
justiciable, it had to overcome the presumption established by Justice
Frankfurter in Colegrove v. Green that political rights cases are nonjusticiable. 228 Citing Nixon v. Herndon,229 one of the White Primary Cases,
Justice William J. Brennan, writing for the Court, observed that "the
mere fact that the suit seeks protection of a political right does not
mean it presents a political question." 230 Justice Brennan further reasoned that political rights claims are justiciable by relying on another
Frankfurter opinion, Gomillion v. Lightfoot,231 which had been decided
the prior term, to argue that the state did not have the power to "effect[ ] a discriminatory impairment of voting rights" in violation of
the Constitution.

232

Justice Brennan's reliance on the race cases to support the justiciability of political rights claims prompted a sharp dissenting response from Justice Frankfurter, who retorted that Justice Brennan
had misused Gomillion.2 33 Baker, Frankfurter explained, "is not a case
in which a State has, through a device however oblique and sophisticated, denied Negroes or Jews or redheaded persons a vote, or given
them only a third or a sixth of a vote. That was Gomillion v.
23 4
Lightfoot."
However, Justice Frankfurter's attempts to distinguish Baker from
Gomillion and constrain judicial review of politics to cases of racial discrimination were in vain. Ironically, his own opinion in Gomillion had
unwittingly laid the groundwork for the Court's later decisions in
Baker, Bandemer, and Vieth. This inadvertent effect resulted in part because parrying the contention that racial discrimination cases are nonjusticiable political questions required Frankfurter to confront the
then-prevalent argument that matters affecting voting are within the
225

Id.

226 See 369 U.S. 186 (1962).
227 See e.g., Luis Fuentes-Rohwer, Baker's Promise, Equal Protection, and the Modern Redistricting Revolution: A Pleafor Rationality, 80 N.C. L. REV. 1353, 1366-67 (2002); Leroy C.
Hardy, Considering the Genymander, 4 PEPP. L. REV. 243, 249 (1977).
See 328 U.S. 549, 552 (1946).
228
229 273 U.S. 536 (1927).
230 Baker, 369 U.S. at 209.
231
364 U.S. 339 (1960).
232 Baker, 369 U.S. at 229-31.
233 See id. at 300 (Frankfurter, J., dissenting).
234

Id. (citation omitted).
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province of the states and outside of the purview of the Judiciary. 23 5
Frankfurter did so by maintaining that political rights are within the
domain of the states except where a state's action infringes upon an
explicit constitutional command. 2 36 For example, in Gomillion, Frankfurter stated that "the Court has never acknowledged that the States
have power to do as they will with municipal corporations regardless
of consequences. Legislative control of municipalities, no less than
other state power, lies within the scope of relevant limitations imposed
by the United States Constitution."' 23 7 An important corollary of this
reply is that the Constitution limits the state's prerogative only in cases
involving racial discrimination in voting. 23 8 Recall also Frankfurter's
statement in Snowden that "the disposition of state offices, the manner
in which they should be filled and contests concerning them, are
solely for state determination, always provided that the equality of
treatment required by the Civil War Amendments is respected." 2 39
Nonetheless, Justice Frankfurter's attempt to distinguish Colegrove
in Gomillion and to limit judicial review of politics to instances involving racial discrimination proved difficult to sustain. 240 Once he provided the opening in Gomillion with the argument that state supremacy
in political rights cases is cabined by the Constitution, it became difficult to limit the exception to cases in which "a legislature .. .singles

out a readily isolated segment of a racial minority for special discriminatory treatment." 24' Because Justice Frankfurter's principle rested,
essentially, on the existence of a constitutional hook forjudicial supervision of politics, which the majority in Baker readily found in the
Equal Protection Clause, 24 2 the opening became a cavern. Hence, in
235 See, e.g., Gomillion v. Lightfoot, 364 U.S. 339, 342 (1960) ("The respondents invoke
generalities expressing the State's unrestricted power-unlimited, that is, by the United
States Constitution-to establish, destroy, or reorganize by contraction or expansion its
political subdivisions, to wit, cities, counties, and other local units.").
236
See, e.g., id. at 347 ("When a State exercises power wholly within the domain of state
interest, it is insulated from federal judicial review. But such insulation is not carried over
when state power isused as an instrument for circumventing a federally protected right.").
Justice White used similar reasoning in Guinn v. United States, noting that state governments retain control over suffrage but that the Fifteenth Amendment constrains states'
power to deny a citizen the right to vote based on race. See 238 U.S. 347, 362 (1915).
237
364 U.S. at 344-45.
238
See, e.g.,
Baker, 369 U.S. at 285-86 (Frankfurter, J., dissenting) (noting that the race
cases "are no exception to the principle of avoiding federal judicial intervention into matters of state government" because those cases vindicate the express directives of the Civil
War Amendments).
239
Snowden v. Hughes, 321 U.S. 1, 15 (1944).
240
For a very nice argument about deferring to Congress to address racial discrimination similar to Frankfurter's distinction, see Ellen D. Katz, Reinforcing Representation: CongressionalPower to Enforce the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments in the Rehnquist and Waite Courts,
101 MICH. L. REv. 2341 (2003).
241
Gomillion, 364 U.S. at 346.
242
369 U.S. at 237.
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Baker, Justice Brennan seized upon Justice Frankfurter's opening in
Gomillion to restyle Gomillion as a case involving the "impairment of
voting rights" '243 in order to support the contention that political
244
rights cases are justiciable.

D.

Race and Politics in Bandemer and Vieth

This, in turn, was the approach that the Court adopted explicitly
in Bandemer and Vieth. In Bandemer, the plaintiffs, Indiana Democrats,
filed suit challenging the state's reapportionment plan. 2 45 The plain-

tiffs argued that the plan constituted a political gerrymander, which
was designed to dilute their votes in violation of the Fourteenth
Amendment's Equal Protection Clause. 24 6 Bandemer presented two
questions that are of continued relevance. First, the Court addressed
whether political gerrymandering claims are justiciable. 247 Second,
the Court considered whether, if they are justiciable, there are stan248
dards to govern such claims.
The Court divided sharply on the question of justiciability but resolved the issue by analogizing political gerrymandering claims to racial dilution claims. 249 In the section of his opinion joined by a
majority of the Court, Justice White maintained that the issue in both
political and racial gerrymandering cases "is one of representation." 250 In both instances, the inquiry is whether a political or racial
group in a state has the same chance to elect representatives as any
other political or racial group. 251 Thus, the constitutional harm, intimated the Court, is the reduced opportunity of the relevant group to
252
elect a representative of its choice or to affect the political process.
The Court concluded that the racial dilution cases "support a conclu243 Id. at 229 ("And only last Term, in Gomillion v. Lightfoot, we applied the Fifteenth
Amendment to strike down a redrafting of municipal boundaries which effected a discriminatory impairment of voting rights, in the face of what a majority of the Court of Appeals
thought to be a sweeping commitment to state legislatures of the power to draw and
redraw such boundaries." (citation omitted)).
244
See id. at 229-30.
245
Davis v. Bandemer, 478 U.S. 109, 115 (1986) (plurality opinion).
246
See id.
247
See id. at 118.
248
See id. at 127 (plurality opinion).
249
See id. at 125 (noting the "futility" of attempting to distinguish political gerrymandering claims from racial gerrymandering claims on justiciability grounds); id. at 131 n.12
(plurality opinion) ("[T]he principles developed in [the race cases] would apply equally to
claims by political groups in individual districts.").
250
Id. at 124.
251
Compare the Court's characterization of the issue in political gerrymandering
cases as whether "each political group in a State [has] the same chance to elect representatives of its choice as any other political group" with its description of the issue in racial
gerrymandering cases as whether "an identifiable racial or ethnic group had an insufficient
chance to elect a representative of its choice." Id.
252
See id.
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sion that [political gerrymandering claims are] justiciable." 253

In

resolving the second issue regarding whether a judicially manageable
standard exists, the plurality was "not persuaded" that no such stan254
dards exist.

While Bandemer was decided in a context in which the Court was
not as concerned with the explicit use of race by the state to benefit
voters of color, by the middle of the 1990s, the Court became more
attentive to the use of race itself regardless of which race was benefited by the state's action. With respect to districting, in Shaw v.
Reno,255 Justice Sandra Day O'Connor, writing for the Court, noted

that race-conscious districts "require careful scrutiny under the Equal
Protection Clause regardless of [the state's] motivations.

'2 56

Two

Johnson,2 57

terms later in Miller v.
the Court concluded that the Equal
Protection Clause is violated when a claimant shows "that race was the
predominant factor motivating the legislature's decision to place a significant number of voters within or without a particular district. '2 58
It is against this backdrop that the Court returned to the problem
of political gerrymandering in Vieth. 259 As in Bandemer, Vieth
presented .two issues: First, whether political gerrymandering claims
are justiciable, 260 and second, whether a manageable standard for
resolving such claims exists. 26 1 Once again, the principal debate
within the Court was whether the Court's racial dilution jurisprudence
was helpful in understanding the harms presented by political gerrymandering and in fashioning a judicially manageable standard.
The plaintiffs had argued in favor of a two-pronged test requiring
proof of intent and effect patterned after the Court's standard in the
racial gerrymandering case, Miller v. Johnson.262 The intent requirement the plaintiffs advocated would demand a showing that redistricters drew lines "with a predominant intent to achieve partisan
advantage."263 As in the racial gerrymandering cases, predominance

would be established by evidence showing that the state abandoned or
subordinated legitimate redistricting criteria in favor of partisan considerations. 264 The Court split in its decision. Four Justices con253

Id. at 125.

254

Id. at 123.

255

509 U.S. 630 (1993).

256

Id. at 645.

515 U.S. 900 (1995).
Id. at 916.
541 U.S. 267 (2004).
260
See id. at 272 (plurality opinion). In other words, the plurality considered whether
to overturn Bandemer. See id.
261
See id.
262
See id. at 284-85 (citing Miller, 515 U.S. at 900).
263 Id. at 284 (emphasis and quotation omitted).
264
See id.
257
258
259
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that political gerrymandering

637

claims are nonjusticiable

265
because there are no judicially manageable standards to apply.

Four others concluded that they are justiciable but had three different
rationales for what standard should apply. 266 The remaining Justice
concluded that he would not declare such claims nonjusticiable be26 7
cause the Court might still find a manageable standard to apply.
The plaintiffs found a particularly receptive ear in Justice Stevens. 268 Stevens, who disagreed with the plurality that no judicially
manageable standards exist to apply, 26 9 argued in his dissent that the
racial dilution cases are useful precedential guides because "the critical issue in both racial and political gerrymandering cases is the same:
whether a single nonneutral criterion controlled the districting process to such an extent that the Constitution was offended. '27°1 For Stevens, the Constitution contains a norm of impartiality. 27' Redistricters
violate this norm of impartiality when they subordinate all other legitimate criteria for partisan or racially discriminatory purposes. 272 Relying upon Gomillion and the Shaw line of cases, Justice Stevens noted
that "a district's peculiar shape might be a symptom of an illicit purpose in the line-drawing process." 2 7 1 Peculiarity of shape would indicate the redistricters' failure to govern impartially and to subsume
legitimate criteria to the singular pursuit of partisan advantage. 274 Justice Stevens concluded that "the racial gerrymandering cases therefore supply a judicially manageable standard for determining when
partisanship, like race, has played too great of a role in the districting

process."

275

See id. at 305-06.
See id. at 334-39 (StevensJ., dissenting); id. at 346-53 (Souter,J., dissenting); id. at
365-67 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
267
See id. at 306 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
268
See id. at 339 (Stevens, J.,dissenting) ("I would apply the standard set forth in the
Shaw cases and ask whether the legislature allowed partisan considerations to dominate
and control the lines drawn, forsaking all neutral principles.").
269
See id.at 318.
270
Id. at 326.
271
See id. at 317 ("The concept of equal justice under law requires the State to govern
impartially.").
272
See id. at 318 ("In my view, when partisanship is the legislature's sole motivationwhen any pretense of neutrality is forsaken unabashedly and all traditional districting criteria are subverted for partisan advantage-the governing body cannot be said to have acted
impartially.").
273
Id. at 321.
274 See id. at 321-22.
275
Id. at 336. Justice Stevens was not the only dissenter influenced by the race cases.
Compare the relationship between elements for political vote dilution in Justice Souter's
framework, id. at 346-53 (Souter, J., dissenting), with the elements of the Court's racial
vote dilution framework under § 2 of the Voting Rights Act (VRA) in Thornburg v. Gingles,
478 U.S. 30, 49-51 (1986).
265
266
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It is against this equivalence of racial and political gerrymandering thatJustice O'Connor, writing in concurrence in Bandemer,2 76 and
Justice Scalia, writing for the plurality in Vieth,27 7 reacted. It is not
surprising that the principal fault line in the political gerrymandering
cases is the relevance of race as a model for thinking about politics.
The relationship between racial and political gerrymandering is a recurring debate within the Court. 278 Thus, in Bandemer and Vieth, the
Justices were performing a much-scripted pas de deux, their moves
were familiar, predictable, and path-dependent.
III
NOT LOOKING FOR STANDARDS IN ALL THE RIGHT PLACES

279

Yet there is a fundamental problem with using the racial gerrymandering cases to reason that political gerrymandering claims are
justiciable: They are completely unsuited for the task. This is not because they do not provide manageable standards, which was the reason advanced by Justice Scalia in Vieth2 80 and shared by a host of
commentators. 28 1 Instead, it is because the "searing question of
race"28 2 obscures the extent to which problems of institutional electoral design in democratic politics are deeply structural and the need
for the federal courts, if they are truly resolved to police the excesses
of democratic politics, to directly confront these structural difficulties. 283 Race obscures these concerns and leads to inquiries-such as

the perennial question of whether political groups are sufficiently like
racial groups to render political gerrymandering claims justiciablethat blur instead of clarify the Court's political gerrymandering jurisprudence. 28 4 As a consequence of this futile inquiry, the Court has
276
277

See 478 U.S. 109, 144 (1986) (O'Connor, J., concurring).
See 541 U.S. at 305-06 (plurality opinion).
278
See supra Part II.
279
With apologies to my good friend Rick Hasen. See Richard L. Hasen, Looking for
Standards (in All the Wrong Places): PartisanGerrymanderingClaimsAfter Vieth, 3 ELECTION LJ.
626 (2004).
280
See 541 U.S. at 305-06 (plurality opinion).
281
See infra Part III.
282
Issacharoff, supra note 4, at 597.
283
See infra Part IV.
284
Consider here Justice O'Connor's opinion in Bandemer, concurring in the judgment and responding to Justice White's plurality opinion on the equivalence of racial and
political gerrymandering claims. See Davis v. Bandemer, 478 U.S. 109, 144 (1986)
(O'ConnorJ., concurring). Justice O'Connor maintained that the Court should be solicitous of racial groups who are "characterized by the traditional indicia of suspectness and
[are] vulnerable to exclusion from the political process." Id. at 151 (quotation omitted).
The voters who are so characterized "enjoy some measure of protection against intentional
dilution of their group voting strength by means of racial gerrymandering." Id. Additionally, Justice O'Connor argued that unlike judicial review of political gerrymandering controversies, judicial review of racial gerrymandering is supported by the "central thrust" of
the Equal Protection Clause. Id. at 161. That provision, she noted, gives "greater war-
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been unable to discover an animating justification for judicial review
of political gerrymandering claims.
It is not that pro-justiciability Justices do not recognize the structural element of political gerrymandering claims. For example, in
Vieth, Justice Kennedy argued that preserving fair and effective representation is the principle to be vindicated in political gerrymandering
claims. 28 5 Moreover, Justice Kennedy strongly, and correctly, intimated that the First Amendment is implicated when the state manipulates the constitutive rules of governance institutions to single out
individuals or groups for disfavored treatment on the basis of their
political identities. 28 6 Similarly, Justice Stevens also identified the
harm as the failure of representation. 2 7 RecallJustice Stevens's claim
that gerrymandering is constitutionally harmful because it "disrupt[s]
the representational norms that ordinarily tether elected officials to
their constituencies as a whole." 28 8 Justice Souter also referenced

structuralist concerns when he focused on vote dilution achieved by
cracking and packing voters into districts, 28 9 as did Justice Breyer
when he conceptualized the injury as the inability of a majority to cap290
ture its share of seats due to manipulation by a political minority.
In essence, each of these Justices was advancing a claim with respect to the appropriate design and composition of governance institutions. Each claim was insuppressibly structural. 29 ' In fact, this was
one point of significant agreement among all of the Justices in Vieth:
Political gerrymandering claims are structural. As I shall argue in this
rant . . . [to] the federal courts to intervene for protection against racial discrimination."
Id. at 151.
Consider also Justice Scalia's response to Justice Stevens in Vieth. See 541 U.S. at
292-95 (plurality opinion). As Justice Scalia argued, the Constitution evinces a particular
concern for racial considerations in the political process that is absent in the context of
political gerrymandering. See id. at 293 ("A purpose to discriminate on the basis of race
receives the strictest scrutiny under the Equal Protection Clause, while a similar purpose to
discriminate on the basis of politics does not."). Moreover, he intimated, race is an immutable characteristic, while political affiliation is not. See id. at 287. It "may shift from one
election to the next; and even within a given election, not all voters follow the party line."
Id.
285 See 541 U.S. at 307 (Kennedy, J., concurring) ("The object of districting is to establish 'fair and effective representation for all citizens.'" (quoting Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S.
533, 565-68 (1964))); id. at 309 (noting the "challenge in finding a manageable standard
for assessing burdens on representational rights").
286
See id. at 315 ("If a court were to find that a State did impose burdens and restrictions on groups or persons by reason of their views, there would likely be a First Amendment violation, unless the State shows some compelling interest.").
287 See id. at 329 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
288
Id.
289 See id. at 343, 354 (Souter, J., dissenting).
290 See id. at 360 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
See, e.g., Gerken, supra note 112, at 506-07, 526-28.
291
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Part, this is the best way to make sense of Justice Scalia's argument
about standards.
Where the Justices disagreed, however, is on the question of
whether these types of structural claims are justiciable and judicially
administrable. The dissenters' greatest flaw was their choice of a
guide; using the race cases as a template doomed the enterprise from
the outset. Justices Kennedy, Souter, and Breyer bemoaned the difficulties of resolving this issue 29 2 but concluded that "[s] ince this Court
has created the problem no one else has been able to solve, it is up to
293
us to make a fresh start."
This problem is complex. It is difficult for courts to adjudicate
structural claims, and this is precisely how individualists have made
their living. For example, they have complained, rather successfully,
that structuralism asks courts to do political philosophy, which is best
left to political philosophers, and to make difficult political judg294
ments, which would be better left to elected politicians.
Justice Scalia also joined in bemoaning the difficulties of the matter, stating that there is no way that courts can make "principled, rational, and . . .reasoned distinctions" using a framework that is as

open--ended as structuralism. 295 That is why, he maintained, that
29 6
these structural decisions are best left to the political branches.
Justice Scalia asserted that Bandemer ought to be abandoned because Justice White's standard, which was "misguided when proposed," is not manageable. 297 The conventional wisdom about Vieth is
that the Court divided on the issue of judicially manageable standards. 298 But scholars have misunderstood the meaning of judicial
manageability and have mistakenly interpreted the phrase to refer to
the concept of judicial administrability, which refers to developing a
29 9
standard for determining the legality of political gerrymandering.
This misunderstanding has led to what can only be a fruitless search
for judicially manageable standards. As this Part argues, Vieth is not at
all about the availability of judicially administrable standards. Moreo292
See Vieth, 541 U.S. at 306-07 (Kennedy, J.,concurring); id. at 344 (Souter, J., dissenting); id. at 356 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
293 Id. at 345 (Souter, J., dissenting).
294 See, e.g.,
HASEN, supra note 133, at 139.
295 Vieth, 541 U.S. at 278 (plurality opinion).
296
See id. at 305-06.
Id. at 283.
297
298
See, e.g.,
Berman, supra note 19, at 810; Gardner, supra note 8, at 643; Richard
Hasen, supra note 279, at 626; Frederick McBride & Meredith Bell-Platts, Extreme Makeover:
Racial Consideration and the Voting Rights Act in the Politics of Redistricting, 1 STAN. J. C.R. &
C.L. 327, 346 (2005).
299
See JOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DisTRusT: A THEORY OF JUDICIAL REVIEW
120-21 (1980) (advancing a similar point with respect to the "one person, one vote"
principle).
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ver, Justice Scalia's point was not a positive claim regarding the availability of standards. Rather, it was a normative claim about
constitutional interpretation. In fact, the standards argument Justice
Scalia made plainly reflects his refusal to adjudicate what he clearly
views as structural claims.
A.

On Standards

In Bandemer,Justice White, speaking for the plurality, identified
the harm caused by political gerrymandering as a reduced opportunity to affect the political process, particularly as it relates to electing a
candidate of choice. 3° The plurality operationalized its conception
of the harm-whether an electoral structure "consistently degrade[s]
a voter's or a group of voters' influence on the political process as a
whole" 3 0 1-by maintaining that plaintiffs alleging political vote dilution must "prove both intentional discrimination against an identifiable political group and an actual discriminatory effect on that
group. '30 2 The plurality did not mean for the intent requirement to
impose a significant barrier; as it stated, "[p]olitics and political con' 30 3
siderations are inseparable from districting and apportionment.
Thus, "[a] s long as redistricting is done by a legislature, it should not
be very difficult to prove that the likely political consequences of the
30 4
reapportionment were intended."
The effects requirement, in contrast, was intended as a formidable obstacle to claims of political gerrymandering. The plurality felt
itself constrained by two unenviable choices. On the one hand, it did
30 5
not want to mandate proportional representation in districting,
though the Court flirted with the concept as a rough baseline measure. 30 6 On the other hand, the plurality was also reticent to present a
30 7
ready opportunity for perpetual litigation of districting plans.
Thus, it erected an overwhelming standard: A statewide plan violates
the effects prong "where the electoral system substantially disadvantages certain voters in their opportunity to influence the political process effectively." 30 8 This lack of influence is evidenced by the
"continued frustration of the will of a majority of the voters or effec300
301
302
303
304
305
306

See Davis v. Bandemer, 478 U.S. 109, 132-33 (1986) (plurality opinion).

108

Id.

Id. at
Id.at
Id. at
Id. at
See id.

132.
127.
128.
129.
at 130.

See id. at 125 n.9 (stating that the Court's decision was "not a preference for proportionality per se but a preference for a level of parity between votes and representation sufficient to ensure that ... majorities are not consigned to minority status").
307
See id. at 133 (plurality opinion) (noting that "a low threshold for legal action
would invite attack on all or almost all reapportionment statutes").
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tive denial to a minority of voters of a fair chance to influence the
political process.

3 09

Justice Scalia's responsive move in Vieth was to sound the retreat.
Justice Scalia argued that Bandemer ought to be abandoned because
Justice White's plurality opinion failed to provide judicially manageable standards. 310 No court, he maintained, had ever effectively struck

down a redistricting plan on Bandemer grounds. 3 11 "[I]n all of the
cases we are aware of" in which plaintiffs challenged supposed political gerrymanders, "relief was denied."3 12 Moreover, because Scalia
found that neither race nor any of the myriad standards suggested by
the dissenters could be useful for assessing political gerrymandering,
he concluded that political gerrymandering claims were
313
nonjusticiable.
What does it mean to say that the Bandemer standard is unmanageable? The plurality's opinion does not tell us explicitly. To best
understand why Justice Scalia was not looking for standards and did
not truly want to find any, let us explore what he might have meant by
the proposition that the Bandemer standard is unmanageable by examining the three possibilities that we can cull from the opinion.
B.

A Standard that Works

First, a manageable standard might mean one that works or, in
other words, results in judicial intervention. Justice Scalia noted that
while Bandemer has generated a fair amount of litigation, the case
"'has served almost exclusively as an invitation to litigation without
much prospect of redress.' "314 Seemingly, a standard is not manageable if after a significant period-eighteen years-the Court has nothing to show for its efforts.3 15 Justice Scalia concluded that the failure
of the lower courts to find a single violation of Bandemer's standard is
tantamount to a holding that gerrymandering claims are nonjusticia3
ble. 3 16 The standard is unmanageable because it does not "work."

309

Id.

310

See
See
Id.
See
Id.

311

312
313
314

17

Vieth v. Jubelirer, 541 U.S. 267, 278-81 (2004) (plurality opinion).
id.

at 279-80.
id. at 305-06.
at 279 (quoting

SAMUEL ISSACHAROFF ET AL., THE LAW OF DEMOCRACY: LEGAL

886 (2d ed. 2002)).
See id. at 281 ("Eighteen years ofjudicial effort with virtually nothing to show for it
justify us in revisiting the question whether the standard promised by Bandemer exists.").
316
See id. at 279-81.
Id. at 303 ("The lower courts were set wandering in the wilderness for 18 years not
317
because the Bandemer majority thought it a good idea, but because five Justices could not
agree upon a single standard, and because the standard the plurality proposed turned out
not to work.").
STRUCTURE OF THE POLITICAL PROCESS
315
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But it is not clear what relief has to do with manageability. That
the claim is justiciable does not mean that a violation ought to be
found. "A conclusion that a claim is justiciable is a prerequisite to
deciding-not a decision of-the question whether the conduct complained of violates the Constitution. "318 Note that Justice Scalia's
claim is not that there are violations but lower courts have not been
able to provide relief because the Bandemer standard is unmanageable. 31 9 Rather, his claim is that lower courts have not found that any
claims violate the Bandemer standard. 320 The obvious answer is that
lower courts have not found any violations because there are no violations, or, at least, lower courts have not found any violations of the
type that Bandemer was meant to detect.
Of course, Justice Scalia may be making a claim about the decision costs (or even the error costs) of resolving gerrymandering claims
under the Bandemer standard. There are various costs to the legal system that arise from allowing litigation and adjudication of these gerrymandering claims. What is the point of incurring these decision costs
when the outcome is invariable? The decision costs argument would
be correct if one assumes that the costs of arriving at a correct decision outweigh the benefits of judicial review. In order to decide
whether to abandon Bandemer on these grounds, one has to weigh the
deterrent effects of justiciability against the decision costs. Put differently, we would have to know what the behavior of political elites
would be like in the absence of Bandemer and compare it with the costs
of deciding claims under Bandemer to decide whether the decision
costs are too much to bear.
Justice Scalia's point is the somewhat implausible contention that
the justiciability of political gerrymandering claims has no impact on
the behavior of redistricters because the Court has not yet found a
violation. If this point is empirically correct, then Justice Scalia's position in Vieth is the right one. However, to arrive at that conclusion,
one would have to assume that redistricters would behave exactly the
same in a world in which the Constitution imposed no limitations on
extreme political gerrymandering as they would in a world in which
there were some vague limitations. It is true that there are other
structural or political restraints on the ability of redistricters to gerrymander willy-nilly. 32 1 But it is hard to deny thatjudicial review is con3 22
sequential, whether one agrees with the consequences or not.
Lowenstein, supra note 22, at 66.
See Vieth, 541 U.S. at 279-81 (plurality opinion).
320
See id.
321
See, e.g., Gelman & King, supra note 101.
322
For a brilliant analysis of the consequences of judicial review with respect to the
reapportionment revolution, see GARY W. Cox & JONATHAN N. KATZ, ELBRIDGE GERRY'S
318
319
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Second, if Bandemeris to be applied only in extreme cases of political gerrymandering, actual violations in fact would be rare. Justice
Scalia's criticism of Justice White's opinion on the ground that
Bandemer "'has served almost exclusively as an invitation to litigation
without much prospect of redress ' 323 is thus truly unconvincing.
Nonjusticiability is not the only resolution within the legal framework
for lowering decision costs. If plaintiffs are filing meritless claims,
they should be sanctioned. Moreover, lower courts should of course
feel free to dismiss meritless claims on 12(b) (6) grounds as called for
under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. 324 It is not clear why a
holding of nonjusticiability is the proper method of curing "pointless
litigation"3 2 5 under Bandemer when the traditional procedural mechanisms for minimizing the ubiquitous incentives to litigate are
available.326

C.

A Standard that Provides Relief

Second, one can maintain that a standard is unmanageable because lower courts are simply incapable of applying the standard. Implying that his conceptualization of unmanageability means the
inability of lower courts to apply the standard, Justice Scalia noted that
"in the lower courts, the legacy of [Bandemer] is one long record of
puzzlement and consternation." 3 27 But Justice Scalia's evidence to
support that point is particularly misleading. He implies that lower
courts have not provided relief because they are frustrated by
Bandemer, while in fact, those who have expressed such frustration
constitute the minority of lower courts who have addressed partisan
gerrymandering claims.3 28 Most lower courts, however, have applied
Bandemer without expressing any difficulty at all. 329 Indeed, one lower

court actually praised Bandemer for clearing up the confusion that surSALAMANDER:

THE

ELECTORAL

CONSEQUENCES

OF THE

REAPPORTIONMENT

REVOLUTION

(2002).
323

Vieth, 541 U.S. at 279 (plurality opinion) (quoting ISSACHAROFF ET AL., supra note

314, at 886).
324

325

FED. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6).

Vieth, 541 U.S. at 306 (plurality opinion).
Justice Scalia might also be saying that the Bandemer standard is not administrable,
i.e., lower courts cannot apply the standard. This is a descriptive claim that available evidence refutes. See infra text accompanying notes 327-29.
327
Vieth, 541 U.S. at 282-83 (plurality opinion).
328 See Session v. Perry, 298 F. Supp. 2d 451 (E.D. Tex. 2004), vacated and remanded sub
nom. Henderson v. Perry, 543 U.S. 941 (2004); Martinez v. Bush, 234 F. Supp. 2d 1275
(S.D. Fla. 2002); O'Lear v. Miller, 222 F. Supp. 2d 850 (E.D. Mich. 2002).
329
See La Porte County Republican Cent. Comm. v. Bd. of Comm'rs of the County of
La Porte, 43 F.3d 1126 (7th Cir. 1994); Anne Arundel County Republican Cent. Comm. v.
State Admin. Bd. of Election Laws, 781 F. Supp. 394 (D. Md. 1991); Republican Party of
Virginia v. Wilder, 774 F. Supp. 400 (W.D. Va. 1991); Bandham v. Eu, 694 F. Supp. 664
(N.D. Ca. 1988).
326
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rounds political gerrymandering claims. 3 3°) Thus, at least in this case,

judicial manageability cannot mean the inability of lower courts to ascertain and apply the standard of the case.
D.

A Principled Rule

Finally, one could argue that ajudicially manageable standard is a
principled and rational rule. Justice Scalia maintained that what it
means to be an Article III court is that 'Judicial action must be governed by standard,by rule.' 3 3 1 While "[1] aws promulgated by the Legis-

lative Branch can be inconsistent, illogical and ad hoc[,] law
pronounced by the courts must be principled, rational, and based
upon reasoned distinctions." 3 32 While Justice Scalia's point is unclear,
consider two possible interpretations of his statements.
The first interpretation is that Justice Scalia is arguing that, as a
descriptive matter, Bandemer does not articulate a principled rule or
standard. This view would be consistent with the conventional reading of the Vieth plurality opinion that political gerrymandering claims
are not justiciable because manageable standards are completely absent.3 3- 3 But this reading is off the mark. As some scholars have rightly
argued, Bandemer does present judicially manageable standards, defined as a principled rule or standard. 3 34 For example, Professor Lowenstein has argued that "the gerrymandering claims the plurality is
prepared to recognize are claims brought by political groups that have
suffered from discrimination to the degree that their status under the
Equal Protection Clause is analogous to the status of racial minorities. '33 5 From Professor Lowenstein's perspective, a plaintiff would be

entitled to relief to the extent that she can show that she is part of a
group that suffers from extensive discrimination and that the district336
ing plan discriminates significantly against her group.
Professors Grofman and Fuentes-Rohwer have also extracted judicially manageable standards from the Bandemer plurality. In Professor
Grofman's view, "[i]f partisan gerrymandering effects are to be held
unconstitutional they must be shown to be (1) serious in nature, and
330 See, e.g.,
Duckworth v. State Admin. Bd. of Election Laws, 332 F.3d 769, 774 (4th
Cir. 2003) (stating that the Court in Bandemer had provided "clear" and "specific" guidance
to resolve political gerrymander claims).
331
Vieth, 541 U.S. at 278 (plurality opinion).
332

Id.

333 See, e.g., Berman, supra note 19, at 810; Gardner, supra note 8, at 643; Hasen, supra
note 279, at 626; McBride & Bell-Platts, supra note 298, at 346.
134 See, e.g.,
Bernard Grofman, Toward a Coherent Theory of Gerrymandering. Banderner
and Thornburg, in POLITICAL GERRYMANDERING AND THE COURTS, supra note 22, at 29, 30;
Lowenstein, supra note 22, at 66-67.
3-5 Lowenstein, supra note 22, at 81.
336 See id. at 85.
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(2) likely to be persistent in duration." 33 7 Under Bandemer, only the

most egregious political gerrymanders are unconstitutional. -3 8

Simi-

larly, Professor Fuentes-Rohwer has explained:
Bandemer ...

signals a judicial propensity to safeguard the demo-

cratic process gingerly. As long as the process functions properly,
the Court will remain uninvolved; only when the process malfunctions, to the point of collapse, will the Court intervene and afford
3 39
litigants a remedy, in the name of democratic principles.
3 40
Judicial intervention is reserved only for the most "extreme cases."
Though one could disagree with how Professors Lowenstein,
Grofman, and Fuentes-Rohwer interpret Bandemer, it would be difficult to deny that their readings of Bandemer present the Court with
options for choosing standards that are judicially manageable-defined as a standard based upon a principled and rational rule3 41-to
address the problem of political gerrymandering. Thus, Bandemercannot truly be said to have lacked a manageable standard so defined
because it did in fact offer principled rules based upon reasoned
distinctions.
Curiously, Justice Scalia's plurality opinion in Vieth does not explain why the standards enunciated in Bandemer are not judicially
manageable. 3 42 In fact, the opinion does not analyze the manageability of the Bandemer standard at all. 3 43 Instead, Justice Scalia merely
rehashed others' criticisms of the standard: Justice O'Connor and Justice Lewis F. Powell did not believe that the standard was managea-

ble, 344 lower courts have had difficulty applying the standard,3 45 and

academics have criticized the standard.3 46 Justice Scalia then moved
on to conclude that the standard is not judicially manageable without
actually explaining why that is so. 3 47 Consequently, we are forced to

reject the first interpretation as implausible.
The second possibility is that Justice Scalia meant to invoke Justice Frankfurter's arguments in Colegrove and Baker that the apportionment cases were nonjusticiable because "standards meet for judicial
337
338

Grofman, supra note 334, at 37.
Id. at 57-58.

341

Fuentes-Rohwer, supra note 147, at 562.
Id. at 565.
See Vieth v. Jubelirer, 541 U.S. 267, 278-306 (2004) (plurality opinion).

342

See id. at 305-06.

343

346

See
See
See
See

347

See id. at 283-84.

339
340

344
345

id. at 281-84.
id. at 282.
id. at 282-83.
id. at 283.
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judgment are lacking. ' 348 As I have shown elsewhere,3

49

Frankfurter's

concern in those cases was not that the Court could not promulgate a
rule, principle, or standard. Rather, his point was that whatever standard the Court promulgated, it would not derive from the text, structure, or tradition of the Constitution. 3 50 There is some support in
Vieth that Justice Scalia was channeling Justice Frankfurter. Specifically, Justice Scalia noted that a rule or standard "is not whateverjudges
3 51
choose to do ...or even whatever Congress chooses to assign them."
Instead, an Article III court legitimately announces a rule or standard
when it is "act[ing] in the manner traditional for English and American courts.

35 2

But what does it mean to "act in the manner traditional for English and American courts"? To answer that question, one must appreciate how Justice Scalia began the opinion as opposed to how he
ended it. One must also understand how truly Frankfurterian Scalia is
in this context. He began the opinion with what some commentators
have called "an intriguing feint" 353 -the statement that "[p]olitical
gerrymanders are not new to the American scene.

'354

Echoing Frank-

furter's opinion in Colegrove, Scalia then went on to state that "[i]t is
significant that the Framers provided a remedy for such practices in
the Constitution[,]" which placed the ultimate authority for dealing
with such matter in the hands of Congress. 355 Furthermore, Congress, Scalia stated, has not failed in its duties. 356 Rather, it is aware
that political gerrymandering is a problem and has been in the process of crafting a resolution for some time. 3 57 In fact, he noted,

"[s]ince 1980, no fewer than five bills have been introduced to regulate gerrymandering in congressional districting. 3'1 5 8 Yet after begin-

ning the opinion this way, Justice Scalia seemed to retreat from the
idea and divert from the path Justice Frankfurter took in Colegrove.
However, when one looks below the surface, it becomes clear that perhaps this appearance of a divergence is misleading.
Recall that for Justice Frankfurter, a judicially manageable standard is one that derives from the text or structure of the Constitu348 Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 289 (1962) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting); see Colegrove
v. Green, 328 U.S. 549, 552-53 (1946) (plurality opinion).
349 See Charles, supra note 26, at 1123-29.
350 See id. at 1126.
351
Vieth, 541 U.S. at 278 (plurality opinion) (citations omitted).
352

Id.

353 Issacharoff & Karlan, supra note 17, at 559.
354 Vieth, 541 U.S. at 274 (plurality opinion).
355 Id. at 275.
356 Id. at 276 ("The power bestowed on Congress to regulate elections, and in particular to restrain the practice of political gerrymandering, has not lain dormant.").
357 See id. at 276-77.
358
Id.
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tion. 359 For Frankfurter, the constitutional structure does not allocate
power to the federal courts to resolve all issues that come within the
ambit of the Constitution. Instead, some constitutional commands
fall under the exclusive jurisdiction of the other branches. For example, in Colegrove, Justice Frankfurter stated, "The Constitution has
many commands that are not enforceable by courts because they
clearly fall outside the conditions and purposes that circumscribe judicial action."3 60 I will refer to these as structural commands. Commands falling within the purview of judicial action include the
resolution of private wrongs but not disputes regarding "the general
frame and functioning of government. ' 36 1 The Constitution delegates disputes arising from these structural commands to "the fidelity
of the executive and legislative action and, ultimately, on the vigilance
of the people in exercising their political rights."36 2 Similarly, in
Nixon,363 the late Chief Justice William H. Rehnquist stated:
[T]he concept of a textual commitment to a coordinate political
department is not completely separate from the concept of a lack of
judicially discoverable and manageable standards for resolving it;
the lack ofjudicially manageable standards may strengthen the conclusion that there is a textually demonstrable commitment to a co364
ordinate branch.
Disputes that circumscribe the circumstances for judicial action
are judicially manageable not necessarily because the Constitution itself specifies a precise or explicit standard. Rather, they are manageable because the federal courts have a constitutionally mandated duty
3 65
to provide a federal forum for the vindication of individual rights.
Conversely, disputes that invoke the structural commands of the Constitution are not judicially manageable because the Constitution does
not give the federal courts a role to play.3 6 6 Thus, Justice Scalia stated
in Vieth, while it is the role of the Court "'to say what the law is[,]' . . .
[s] ometimes . .. the law is that the judicial department has no business entertaining the claim of unlawfulness-because the question is
359
See Charles, supra note 26, at 1123-29. The Court then affirmed Frankfurter's construction in Nixon v. United States. See 506 U.S. 224, 228-29 (1993) ("[T]he concept of a
textual commitment to a coordinate political department is not completely separate from
the concept of a lack ofjudicially discoverable and manageable standards for resolving it;
the lack ofjudicially manageable standards may strengthen the conclusion that there is a
textually demonstrable commitment to a coordinate branch.").
360
Colegrove v. Green, 328 U.S. 549, 556 (1946) (plurality opinion).
361
See Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 287 (1962) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting).
362
Colegrove, 328 U.S. at 556 (plurality opinion).
363
506 U.S. 224 (1993).
364
Id. at 228-29.
365
See, e.g., Baker, 369 U.S. at 287-88 (Frankfurter, J., dissenting).
366
See, e.g., id.; Colegrove, 328 U.S. at 554, 556 (plurality opinion).
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entrusted to one of the political branches or involves no judicially en' 3 67
forceable rights.
If this point is correct-if Justice Scalia is not advancing a descriptive claim with respect to the availability of standards, but rather a
claim that the Constitution has not delegated the authority to resolve
political gerrymandering claims to the federal courts but to Congress-the "feint"368 in Vieth is not the argument about how the Constitution has delegated the remedy for political gerrymandering to
Congress. 369 Instead, the feint is the argument about standards.
From this perspective, it becomes clear thatJustice Scalia was not truly
worried about finding manageable standards-plenty of those were
available. As I noted earlier, Justice Scalia did not even bother to ex370
plain why Justice White's standard in Bandemerwas not manageable.
Indeed, as Justice Scalia himself stated in Vieth in response to Justice
Kennedy's opinion, the case presented the Court with only two options: "We can affirm because political districting presents a nonjusticiable question; or we can affirm because we believe the correct
standard which identifies unconstitutional political districting has not
been met; we cannot affirm because we do not know what the correct
standard is." 3 71 Thus, one cannot take seriously the claim in Vieth that
standards are absent.
For the Vieth plurality's argument about standards to make sense,
it has to be a claim about the role of the Judiciary and whether it
should entertain these types of structural claims. In other words, it
has to be an argument about structuralism. Thus, Justice Scalia's
main point in Vieth was that the federal courts cannot entertain structural claims in the context of political rights because the Constitution
37 2
commits those claims to the political process.
IV
THE RIGHTS-STRUCTURES DEBATE IN LAW AND POLITICS

Justice Scalia's point is an important one, and his challenge has
served as a stumbling block for those Justices on the Court and structuralists in the academy who maintain that political gerrymandering
claims are justiciable. This Part unpacks the individualists' arguments
and shows how the Court can address and resolve structural claims in
367 Vieth v. Jubelirer, 541 U.S. 267, 277 (2004) (plurality opinion) (quoting Marbury v.
Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 177 (1803)).
368 Issacharoff & Karlan, supra note 17, at 559.
369
Or to put the point more accurately: If Justice Scalia's descriptive claim is wholly
dependent upon the normative claim, then it is the normative claim that is doing all of the
work and not the descriptive one.
370
See supra notes 342-47 and accompanying text.
371
Vieth, 541 U.S. at 305 (plurality opinion).
372
See id. at 277.
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the law of politics by developing an approach that I call "election law
dualism."3

73

Election law dualism explains how federal courts en-

gaged in structural analysis can borrow "a well-established and shared
set of conventions for cabining judicial discretion" from the individual
rights framework. 3 74 These conventions include doctrines such as
"standing, ripeness, limits upon who can represent whom in a suit,
restrictions on the type of judicial remedies available, etc. '3 75 Part
IV.A addresses the argument that courts should not make contested
democratic judgments and privilege their theory of democracy to that
of other, more democratically legitimate actors. Part IV.B responds to
the arguments that structuralism is too abstract a theory to be the basis of courts' jurisprudence.
A. Judges and Contested Value Judgments
Individualists have generally advanced two arguments against
structuralism as a method of constitutional interpretation for resolving conflicts in law and politics. First, individualist scholars have argued that structuralism asks judges to make difficult decisions about
politics that are best left to elected officials.3 7 6 Individualists further
contend that because elected officials are democratically elected, it is
their responsibility to make contested judgments about representation. 3 77 Structuralism, they explain, would permit judges to privilege
their theory of democracy-particularly when that theory does not
concern a fundamental democratic principle-to that of elected political officials. 3 78 Consequently, they maintain, structuralism "leads inevitably to intrusive judicial involvement in states' political
arrangements."

379

At the outset, it is worth noting that there is an essential difference between, on the one hand, a per se objection to structural theories in principle as an interpretive approach to resolving problems of
law and politics and, on the other hand, objecting to particular applications of structuralism to specific problems in law and politics.

38 0

That structuralism may not be able to resolve all of the problems of
373
Election law dualism builds upon suggestions that Professor Heather Gerken and I
have made independently with respect to how structuralism might be reconceived to better
directjudicial review and cabin judicial discretion in democratic politics. See Charles, Politics,
supra note 16, at 1113-30; Gerken, supra note 112, at 517-39.
374 Gerken, supra note 112, at 530.
375

Id.

376

See, e.g.,
HASEN, supra note 133 passim

See, e.g., Persily, supra note 20, at 677-79.
See Cain, supra note 11, at 1600; Persily, supra note 20, at 678.
379
Cain, supra note 11, at 1600; see also HASEN, supra note 133, at 139 (characterizing
structural theories as "misguided and dangerous" because they "require great intrusion by
the judiciary into the political processes without sufficient justification").
380
I am grateful to Rick Pildes for pointing out this distinction.
377

378
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democratic politics does not mean that it is not a useful or essential
approach to thinking about law and politics. While structuralism
might arguably be less useful in helping us to work out the more difficult problems in election law, the strength of that evaluation would
necessarily depend upon whether competing approaches prove even
more successful in achieving those tasks. I take individualists, however, to be interested in the broader claim-that structuralism as a
theoretical approach is not useful for guiding judicial review of democratic politics. I also understand part of that claim to include a subsidiary element that structuralism is not a useful approach because it
cannot resolve the most difficult challenge of the field, the problem of
political gerrymandering.
In the remainder of this Part, I confront directly this broader argument and its subsidiary element. The essential point here is that
structuralism is the best framework to respond to the problems of law
and politics, including, in particular, the problem of political gerrymandering. In the course of making that argument, I offer three specific reasons why the individualists' objections are off the mark.
1. Elections as Legitimating Devices
First, individualists cannot use elections as a legitimating device
in order to justify their preference for the judgments of elected officials to those ofjudges. This is because elected officials seek to manipulate the very entities-governance institutions or electoral
structures-that legitimate their actions as elected officials. Put differently, the fact of an election as a democratic event is meaningless if
the "winner" of that election or her allies manipulated the election.
Perhaps more pointedly, after almost a decade of judicial regulation of the fundamental rules of democratic politics, it may be time to
acknowledge the virtue of the distinction between judicial regulation
of the fundamental rules of the democratic process and judicial involvement in ordinary politics. 3 8 1 This distinction reflects an underly-

ing assumption of judicial supervision in this context. We would be
concerned, and rightly so, if the Court took it upon itself to substitute
its judgment on ordinary public policy matters for those of political
-81
This argument is akin to Hamilton's argument in Federalist No. 78 that the federal
courts are responsible for giving effect to the Constitution "as a fundamental law," which is
designed to constrain, direct, and legitimate the actions of the elected class. THE FEDERALisT No. 78, at 229 (Alexander Hamilton) (Roy P. Fairfield ed., 1966). An important
Hamiltonian insight from Federalist No. 78 is that the legislative body cannot be the judge
of its own constitutive powers. See id. If the concept of representation is to be meaningful-if we are to prevent "the representatives of the people [from] substitut[ing] their will
to that of their constituents," one needs the courts as "an intermediate body between the
people and the legislature, in order, among other things, to keep the latter within the
limits assigned to their authority." Id.
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elites. The appropriate response to judicial meddling in ordinary
politics would be to raise the objection that public policy decisions
3 2
appropriately are the province of elected officials, and not judges.
The presumption in favor of elected officials and againstjudicial meddling in the context of ordinary political judgments militates against
judicial involvement barring the traditional exceptional circumstances
(e.g., legislation enacted with a discriminatory racial purpose).
By contrast, disputes regarding the constitutive rules of democratic politics should come with much less of a presumption in favor
of the actions of elected officials and, in turn, much less of a presumption against judicial supervision because elections and the constitutive
rules of the political process matter as legitimating devices. Because
they matter as legitimating devices, they cannot be bootstrapped into
legitimating distorted outcomes. Thus, it is incongruously tautological to argue that courts should defer to the judgment of political
elites-and allow them to manipulate electoral structures to facilitate
their own elections-because they were elected by the political
process.
2.

383
Got No Theory

Second, individualists have failed to present an alternative and
compelling theory of democracy to support institutional distortion of
electoral outcomes by political elites. An essential component in the
individualists' argument against structuralism is the objection that
courts are supplanting the legitimate democratic judgments of political actors with the judges' understanding of what democracy
38 4
requires.
This second response to individualists draws on recent work by
Professor Daniel Ortiz and goes more to the substance of the individualists' argument.38 5 Professor Ortiz calls the proposition that "the
Court must defer to the political branches in these political cases to
avoid freezing one particular theory of politics into the structure of
governance" the "got theory" argument. 3 6 The proposition further
states that "[n] o matter how certain the Court is that a particular theory of equality, representation, or political behavior is right . . . it

should nonetheless refrain from striking down conflicting arrangements, because doing so would displace the state's own choice among
3 87
competing and acceptable political theories."
382
383
384
385
386

See Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 217 (1962).
See Daniel R. Ortiz, Got Theory?, 153 U. PA. L. REv. 459 (2004).
See id.
See id.
Id. at 460.

387

Id.
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As Professor Ortiz argues, though it implies that electoral structures are the product of democratic choice, the "got theory" argument
is misleading and unhelpful because it "fails even to inquire whether
an alternative" theory of democracy actually supported how the governance institution at issue was composed. 388 Put differently, individualists do not-and probably cannot-demonstrate that the state
proposed and enacted the electoral structure at issue because the
state was trying to effectuate a particular theory of democracy. As Professor Ortiz rightly concludes:
Despite its rhetorical progressiveness, the "got theory" argument...
amounts to a cry to protect the status quo. It fails on its promise to
encourage states to choose a political theory. By simply hypothesizing legitimate purposes that could underlie [the composition of
discussion about the very issues it
electoral structures], it forecloses
389
claims are so important.
Professor Michael Klarman goes even further than Professor Ortiz to argue that there is no theory of democracy to support institutional distortion, unless entrenchment is such a theory. 39 0 As
Professor Klarman argues, while malapportionment could have been
defended on the ground that political actors wanted to overrepresent
rural interests because of the importance of agriculture to the econ39
omy, no such judgment can support political gerrymandering. '
Fundamentally, the composition of electoral structures cannot be defended on the grounds that the Court would be undermining the political prerogatives of state actors to make contested judgments about
representation until and unless individualists can show that state ac39 2
tors were motivated by the pursuit of democratic ideals.
3.

VindicatingInstitutional Values

The third response to individualists is that they are simply wrong
that structuralism leads courts to make contested value judgments
they otherwise do not have to make. Courts must make value judgments in adjudicating election law claims no matter what framework
they use. 39 3 In fact, almost all of the value judgments the Court has
Id. at 471.
Id. at 475.
See Klarman, supra note 19, at 533-34.
See id. at 531-33. Ironically, individualists are generally supportive of the Court's
391
intervention in the malapportionment cases but object to judicial intervention in political
gerrymandering. See Vieth v. Jubelirer, 541 U.S. 267, 285-86 (2004) (plurality opinion).
392
Cf Klarman, supra note 19, at 551-52 (arguing that judicial review of entrenchment claims would be favorable depending on the scope of the entrenchment problem, its
ability to correct itself, if there are entrenchment explanations for the legislature's behavior, and if there are judicially manageable standards).
388
-89
390

393

See generally HASEN, supra note 133.
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made have been rendered under the purported guise of an individual
3

rights framework.

94

Individualists can certainly contend that courts should not supervise the electoral process and instead abdicate the field altogether. Of
course, in that case, individualists would have to confront what Professor Elizabeth Garrett has termed the problem of "self-interest in institutional design," which arises acutely "when elected officials
determine the rules" of the game. 39 5 One possibility is to sacrifice the
accountability function of representative institutions and acquiesce to
self-entrenchment as a democratic good so long as the "representatives" truly "represent" the views of their constituents. 39 6 For example,
one arguably would not worry about malapportionment or political
gerrymandering because, by enabling the representatives to choose
whom they would represent, there would be closer fit between the
397
views of representatives and their constituents.
The problem with this view is that it renders the concept of representation incoherent. It minimizes the agency of the electorate and
eliminates the idea of responsiveness, which is a crucial component of
what we mean by representation. 398 More precisely, outside of a process-oriented concept of representation (viz., elections) one has no
way of knowing or guaranteeing that officials are representative of the
polity. 399 If the justification for entrenchment is representation-defined as a close fit between what the people want and what their representatives promulgate-that justification cannot be sustained. Recall
here Pitkin's claim that representation is defined in great part in institutional terms. 400 "No particular act of compliance with popular demands is proof of a representative government ....
Without an
institutional account of representation, one cannot speak of a representative government; without representation in a putatively represen"401

See infra text accompanying notes 421-438.
Elizabeth Garrett, Who Chooses the Rules?, 3 ELECTION L.J. 139, 139 (2005).
396
For a recent articulation of this view, see Persily, supra note 20, 667-73 (arguing
that gerrymandering frequently produces proportional representation, reinforces political
diversity, and produces candidates close to voters' ideological preferences).
397
See id.
398
See Erickson et al., supra note 45 (asserting that representatives respond to and
align their policies with public opinion).
399
See MAYo, supra note 15, at 61. In fact, some would argue that though contested
elections are necessary conditions to representation, they are not sufficient. See Pildes,
supra note 15, at 43 ("All theories of representative democracy require, at a minimum, that
those who exercise power be regularly accountable through elections to those they represent; accountability is a necessary, even if not sufficient, condition of democracy.").
400
See PITKIN, supra note 28, at 234.
401
Id.
394
395
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tative system of government, one cannot talk about the consent of the
402
governed.
This institutional account of representation is so compelling that
it has served to justify the Court's intervention in Baker v. Carrand in
the subsequent malapportionment cases. 40 3 If the concept of representation is to be at all meaningful, electoral outcomes must be traceable to voter preferences that have not been manipulated by political
elites. Indeed, the "one person, one vote" principle, which was a
highly contested value judgment when the Court articulated it in the
reapportionment cases, 40 4 is now regarded as a core component of
democratic equality40 5 precisely for this reason.
Thus, value judgments are not a consequence of a rights or structures framework but instead of adjudication itself. Individualists and
structuralists should not concern themselves with whether the Court is
using a rights or structures frame because not much rides on that distinction. Instead, they should concentrate on the types of values that
judicial review is supposed to vindicate. In other words, the focus
ought to be on either the telos of judicial supervision of democratic
politics, whether the Court has anything useful to contribute to resolve the problem of the distortion of governance institutions, or
whether the federal courts can limit political elites' ability to manipulate institutional rules to produce their desired-often self-entrenching-electoral outcomes.
B.

The Abstractness of Structuralism and Election Law Dualism

Unlike the argument that judges should not make contested
value judgments, the second argument that individualists advance has
substantial merit. Here individualists argue that structuralism's principles are too abstract for courts to adjudicate. 40 6 This argument embodies two important components. The first component implies
something about structuralism itself-that structuralism is too vague
See HERZOG, supra note 29, at 208 ("One can imagine (just barely) a society happy
402
to live under the rule of an unresponsive state. I'd call them happy slaves; no matter how
happy they were, we couldn't, in my view, invoke the consent of the governed in describing
their situation.").
403
But cf Robert J. Pushaw, Jr., The Presidential Election Dispute, the Political Question
Doctrine, and the FourteenthAmendment: A Reply to Professors Krent and Shane, 29 FLA. ST. U. L.
REv. 603 (2001).
404
See Bruce E. Cain, An Ethical Path to Reform: Just Elections Considered, 4 ELECTION L.J.
134, 137 (2005).
405
See Sanford Levinson, One Person, One Vote: A Mantra in Need of Meaning, 80 N.C. L.
REv. 1269, 1269 (2002) (referring to the "one-person, one-vote" rule as a "fundamental
maxim" and "the most pervasive legacy of Baker").
406
The corollary to this argument is that only individual rights claims are capable of
adjudication, and therefore courts should only decide such claims. See Baker v. Carr, 369
U.S. 186, 287 (1962) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting); Pildes, supra note 10.
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to direct judicial intervention in the political process. 40 7 The second
component implies something about the judges themselves and reflects a Frankfurterian concern about judicial competence. 408 For
Frankfurter, judges do not have the expertise to resolve
a subject of extraordinary complexity, involving-even after the fundamental theoretical issues concerning what is to be represented in
a representative legislature have been fought out or compromised-considerations of geography, demography, electoral convenience, economic and social cohesions or divergencies among
particular local groups, communications, the practical effects of political institutions like the lobby and the city machine, ancient traditions and ties of settled usage, respect for proven incumbents of
long experience and senior status, mathematical mechanics, cen40 9
suses compiling relevant data, and a host of others.
On this view, it makes as much sense to ask judges to resolve election
law disputes as it does to ask them to prove or disprove the
Heisenberg Uncertainty Principle, the nature of God, or whether the
triangle offense is superior to its rivals. These are not the types of
considerations that "lend themselves to evaluations of a nature that
are the staple of judicial determinations or for which judges are
equipped to adjudicate by legal training or experience or native
wit."

410

Structuralists have offered two primary responses. One response
has been simply to argue that election law claims are best understood
as structural and to reiterate their central complaint that the problem
with adjudication in law and politics is the dominance of an ill-fitting
rights framework, a central weakness of which is this conception of
rights as trumps. 4 11 But this argument quickly loses steam when one
acknowledges that it is not clear that constitutional law anywhere
treats rights as trumps. 41 2 In most areas of constitutional law, the
rights claimant does not win simply because her right conflicts with an
interest of the state. 4 13 Rather, the claimant must make the case that
she is entitled to prevail. 4 14 Even the First Amendment, which would
seem to present the best case for the application of a purely individualist framework if such a case could be made, is not best understood in

409

See Baker, 369 U.S. at 323-24 (Frankfurter, J., dissenting).
See Charles, Politics, supra note 16, at 1126-29.
Baker, 369 U.S. at 323 (Frankfurter, J., dissenting).

410

Id. at 324.

407
408

See generally Pildes, supra note 10.
Richard Pildes convincingly advances this argument. See id.
413
For an example of a case where the state's rights prevailed despite the conflicting
rights of individuals, see Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965). On the structural
conceptions of equality, see DON HERZOG, POISONING THE MINDS OF THE LOWER ORDERS
(1998); Don Herzog, How to Think About Equality, 100 MICH. L. Ruv. 1621, 1634-38 (2002).
414
See, e.g., Griswold, 381 U.S. at 479.
411

412
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individualist terms.4 t - Thus, while this notion of rights as trumps is a
41 6
wonderful trope, it dimly reflects existing constitutional doctrine.
The first response is unhelpful because it characterizes the rightsstructure debate simply as one about essentialism-whether election
law claims should be viewed as essentially structural or individualist.
The problem with this view is that both individualists and structuralists
are mistaken in their belief that the debate is one about essentialism,
because the Court has not generally viewed election law claims in such
essentialist terms. 41 7 A second and more helpful response has been to
point out that "the 'rights' at stake in political cases are already struc418
tured and conditioned by . . . prior institutional-design choices."
To understand the content of political rights, one must come to terms
419
with the "institutional structures within which those rights exist."
Thus, one must make judgments-structural judgments-about the
content of democratic politics.
In the next subpart, I build upon this second response by showing specifically in the contexts of malapportionment and race how
judgments that seem to be about individual rights reflect underlying
structural considerations. In addition, I also show how the Court has
handled the rights-structure issue and adjudicated election law claims.
Specifically, in the malapportionment context, the Court has gener4 20
ally understood election law claims as reflecting dualist properties.
I define a dualistic claim as a political rights claim that cannot be resolved effectively unless courts address the manner in which individuals or groups are affected by political institutions. To effectively
address most cases of political rights, particularly political gerrymandering, courts must be willing to explicitly deploy a rights-based
framework that focuses on the individual while also employing a structural account that seeks to understand the pathologies of the political
process in institutional terms. This is how the Court has responded to
415
See ALEXANDER MEIKLEJOHN, FREE SPEECH AND ITS RELATION TO SELF-GOVERNMENT
57-91 (1948); ROBERT C. POST, CONSTITUTIONAL DOMAINS: DEMOCRACY, COMMUNITY, MANAGEMENT 268-89 (1995); Frederick Schauer, Towards an Institutional First Amendment, 89
MINN. L. REV. 1256 (2005) (asserting that First Amendment jurisprudence distinguishes
between kinds of speech, not kinds of speakers).
416
See Pildes, supra note 10, at 725-26. It also does not reflect the understandings of
liberal (philosophically, not politically) theorists. SeeJeremy Waldron, Pildes on Dworkin's
Theory of Rights, 21 J. LEGAL STUD. 201 (2000).
417
For example, contrast Lassiter v. Northampton County Board of Elections, 360 U.S. 45
(1959), which contains no language about the importance of individual rights in the voting
context, and Harperv. Virginia State Board of Elections, 383 U.S. 663 (1966), which characterizes voting as an essential liberty. See Pildes, supra note 10, at 745-46. As Pildes noted, "the
Court itself has never seen the contradiction or tension between these pivotal voting-rights
cases that many commentators see." Id. at 746.
418
Pildes, supra note 15, at 52.
419
Id.
420
See infta pp. 660-70.
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the twin individualist challenges of vagueness and judicial incompetence in the reapportionment context, and it is how the Court must
approach political gerrymandering if it is to address the problem
successfully.
1. Rights
Take the Gray42 1- Wesbery422 -Reynolds423 -Lucas4 24 reapportionment quartet of cases, which some view as archetypal individual rights
cases. To some extent, that view is justified because the Court has at
times articulated the constitutional harm in those cases in individualist terms. Consider Gray v. Sanders, in which the Court held Georgia's
county unit-based system of representation unconstitutional. 4 25 Gray,
the Court stated, did not involve the structural problems of gerrymandering that were involved in Baker v. Carr,which concerned the limits
on state authority "in designing the geographical districts from which
representatives are chosen," 4 2 6 or in Gomillion v. Lightfoot, involving
the exclusion "of a minority group from participation in municipal
affairs.4 2 7 Citing the White Primary Cases, the Court noted that Gray is
an individual rights case-"only a voting case."' 4 28 Unlike the struc-

tural cases, Baker and Gomillion, Gray implicated the "constitutionally
protected right" of "qualified voters" to cast their votes and have them
counted.4 29 The constitutional harm that the voter suffers is the
state's failure to respect the voter's "dignity" by diluting his or her
vote. 4 30 If the voter's dignity interest is to be vindicated, the "conception of political equality from the Declaration of Independence, to
Lincoln's Gettysburg Address, to the Fifteenth, Seventeenth, and
Nineteenth Amendments can mean only one thing-one person, one
vote."

43 1

In subsequent cases, the Court continued to articulate its approach in individualist terms. In addition to the "one person, one
vote" mantra in Gray, the Court famously went on in Wesberry v. Sand432
to state that the Constitution, specifically Article I § 2, "means
ers
that as nearly as is practicable one man's vote in a congressional elecGray v. Sanders, 372 U.S. 368, 381 (1963).
Wesberry v. Sanders, 376 U.S. 1 (1964).
Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533 (1964).
Lucas v. Forty-Fourth Gen. Assembly, 377 U.S. 713 (1964).
See 372 U.S. at 381. Georgia determined representation not on a per person basis
425
but on a per county basis. See id. at 370-71.
Id. at 376.
426
421
422
423
424

427

Id.

428
429
430
431
432

Id. at 378.
Id. at 380.
Id.
Id. at 381.
376 U.S. 1 (1964).
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tion is to be worth as much as another's. '43 3 Similarly, in Reynolds v.
434
Sims,
the Court explained that "[a] predominant consideration in
determining whether a State's legislative apportionment scheme constitutes an invidious discrimination violative of rights asserted under
the Equal Protection Clause is that the rights allegedly impaired are
individual and personal in nature." 435 Reiterating the dignitary interests that it argued were in jeopardy in Gray, the Court explained, "To
the extent that a citizen's right to vote is debased, he is that much less
a citizen." 436 And in Lucas v. Fourty-Fourth General Assembly, the Court
stated that a malapportionment scheme was not immune from judicial
43 7
review on the ground that it was adopted by a majority of the voters.
The Court admonished that "[a]n individual's constitutionally protected right to cast an equally weighted vote cannot be denied even by
a vote of a majority of a State's electorate, if the apportionment
scheme adopted by the voters fails to measure up to the requirements
of the Equal Protection Clause." 438 In light of the Court's own framing of the right at issue in the reapportionment cases, one could understand why those cases would be viewed as quintessential individual
rights cases.
2.

Structure

But to categorize those cases as such is to miss an important part
of the story. When one examines those cases at a deeper level, they
are also inherently structural. The principle that makes the reapportionment cases coherent and intelligible is that the composition of
electoral institutions-or what Frankfurter called the "structure and
organization of the political institutions" 4 39-matters.
Recall the legitimate complaint of individualists that structuralism is too amorphous for courts to adjudicate. 440 Recall also the observation made earlier in this Article that sometimes political
outcomes legitimately are the product of endogenous preferences,
and sometimes they are illegitimately the product of exogenous stimuli (e.g., manipulation by political elites). 44 ' If this is true, how do we
know whether a political outcome is the legitimate product of voter
preferences or the product of illegitimate external stimuli? That is,
how do we know whether the outcome is endogenous or exogenous?
433

434
435
436

437
438

4-9
440
441

Id. at 7-8.
377 U.S. 533 (1964).
Id. at 561.
Id. at 567.
See 377 U.S. 713, 736 (1964).
Id.
Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 284 (1962) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting).
See, e.g., id. at 323.
See supra pp. 610-14.
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The truth is that we simply do not know. Justice Souter's baseline
problem is not only his problem but ubiquitous to this domain. Returning to the factual circumstances of Vieth, prior to the post-2000
redistricting, the Republicans maintained an 11-10 edge in Pennsylvania's congressional delegation. 4 42 Following the redrawing of the
lines, the Republicans increased their advantage to 12-7, which was
disappointing because their goal was 13-6. 443 Is the 12-7 outcome the
result of manipulation? What if the outcome had been 11-8 or 13-6?
When is an election a real contest as opposed to a politically manipulated event? How much manipulation is too much? What level of
competition or responsiveness is enough? What baseline should
courts use to measure responsiveness? Should courts measure responsiveness at the district level or at the state level?44 4 Should courts mea-

sure responsiveness against the median voter or voters at either end of
the distribution?
These are not questions that courts in mature democracies can
truly answer in most cases, particularly ex post (in the context of an
actual dispute after the election has taken place). Moreover, they are
simply the wrong questions to ask. They lurk constantly in the background of the Court's political gerrymandering and racial vote dilution jurisprudence. To settle a familiar theme, this is precisely how
the racial vote dilution cases have failed courts. Because the extent of
a state's use of race is often so clear-cut, racial vote dilution cases have
provided courts with a false confidence that they are unquestionably
vindicating individual rights and measuring harm against actual external baselines. 4 45 As such, the racial cases have elided courts' deeply
structural judgments.
a.

Structural Considerationsin the Race Cases

Consider Thornburgv. Gingles446 in which the Court sought to give
content to § 2 of the prohibition of the Voting Rights Act (VRA)
against voting practices or procedures that "result[] in a denial or
abridgement of the right" to vote on the basis of race. 4 47 There, the

plaintiffs argued that the state's use of multimember districts violated
§ 2.448 The Court explained that in order to make out a § 2 claim,
See BARONE ET AL., supra note 130, at 1350.
See id. at 1349, 1350-51.
Recall the debate in Vieth over whether harm ought to be measured at the district
level or at the state level. See Vieth v. Jubelirer, 541 U.S. 267, 285-87 (2004) (plurality
opinion).
445
See Fuentes-Rohwer, supra note 147, at 593 (making similar arguments about early
political gerrymandering cases).
446
478 U.S. 30 (1986).
447
Id. at 36.
448
See id. at 35.
442

443
444
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plaintiffs must show first that they are "sufficiently large and geographically compact to constitute a majority in a single-member district."449

Thus, where voters of color are sufficiently large but

geographically diffuse, they are not protected by the Court's under45
standing of § 2's reach and scope. 0
Note that the Court's involvement in Gingles-in the ostensibly
quintessential context of individual rights-raises precisely the same
questions brought up in the supposedly structural context of political
gerrymandering. Is the inability of African American North Carolinians to elect their preferred voters a consequence of the normal workings of the political process, and thus endogenous, or the
45
consequence of prejudice by white voters, and thus exogenous? '
45 2
How much racial discrimination-or manipulation-is too much?

Finally, with respect to the baseline, why should single-member districts be the baseline for measuring racial representation as against
other structural arrangements? All other things being equal, is it selfevident that geographically diffuse African American voters in State A
should not be protected by § 2 but geographically compact African
American voters in State B ought to be protected? 453 These are precisely the same questions that are raised by judicial supervision of partisan line-drawing. Moreover, they are no less difficult to resolve in
the context of race than in the context of politics.
This is one of the primary lessons of Gomillion v.

Lightfoot.

454

When one reviews the facts of Gomillion, it is very clear that something
untoward had occurred. As Justice Frankfurter stated, when a city
redraws its municipal boundaries to remove 395 out of 400 African
American Tuskegee residents, it is clear that the exercise is "not an
ordinary geographic redistricting measure even within familiar abuses
of gerrymandering.... [It is] tantamount for all practical purposes to
a mathematical demonstration" of unambiguous vote dilution. 45 5 In
that case, the egregiousness of the facts served as the relevant
4 56
baseline.
449
Id. at 50. Plaintiffs must also show that they are politically cohesive and that white
voters vote as a bloc to defeat the preferred candidates of voters of color. See id. at 51.
450
See id. at 50-51.
451
See id. at 51 (noting a difference between "structural [vote] dilution from the mere
loss of an occasional election"); see also id. at 57 (stating that the "loss of political power
through vote dilution is distinct from the mere inability to win a particular election").
452
See id. at 55-56 (admitting that "the degree of bloc voting which constitutes the
threshold of legal significance will vary from district to district").
453
Professor Guinier perceptively advanced this point in her book. See LANI GuiNIER,
TYRANNY OF THE MAJORITY: FUNDAMENTAL FAIRNESS IN REPRESENTATIVE DEMOCRACY (1994).
454
364 U.S. 339 (1960).
455
Id. at 341.
This is reminiscent of whatJohn Hart Ely said about the Court's reaction to Shaw v.
456
Reno. Ely argued that in its holding in Shaw, the Court essentially stated: "We don't know
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The baseline problem reemerges with a vengeance in the racial
vote dilution context when the extent of the state's use of race is not
so obvious. Suppose that in Gomillion, instead of leaving four or five
African American citizens in Tuskegee, the city had left 150 African
American citizens and moved some white citizens out of the city. One
could certainly not say that the city's action amounted "for all practical purposes to a mathematical demonstration" of clear-cut vote dilution. 457 What would the Court do in this revised Gomillion in which
the racial harm is not so straightforward? As it turns out, the answer is
not so apparent.
A useful example here is the Court's recent decision in Georgia v.
Ashcroft. 4 58 Prior to Ashcroft, the Court had concluded in Beer v. United
States45 9 that the Justice Department must approve any districting plan
submitted to them for preclearance by jurisdictions covered by § 5 of
the VRA 4 60 so long as the plan is not retrogressive, which the Court

defined as not making voters of color worse off than they were
before. 4 6 1 With respect to districting and majority-minority districts,
retrogression meant that covered jurisdictions could not reduce the
number of majority-minority districts as compared to the previous districting plan, which served as the relevant baseline. Thus, Beer established a fairly clear-cut (though no less arbitrary) baseline that only
challenged the Justice Department's ability to subtract.
However, in Ashcroft, the Court maintained that the state can use
alternative electoral structures, such as coalition districts (districts in
which voters of color in coalition with white voters can elect their representative of choice) or influence districts (districts in which voters of
color may be able to influence though not control the outcome of
elections), to provide representation for voters of color without violating § 5.462 The choice of electoral structure to effectuate racial representation, the Court maintained, depends upon one's theory of
representation. 46 3 "Section 5," the Court stated, "gives States the flexibility to choose one theory of effective representation over the
other."464
The problem in Ashcroft is that the Court is certainly right that
alternative electoral structures, in particular coalition districts, should
how, we don't know why, but this district has got to be unconstitutional." See John Hart
Ely, Standing to Challenge Pro-Minority Gerrymanders, 111 HARV. L. REv. 576, 579-80 (1997).
457
Gomillion, 364 U.S. at 341.
458
539 U.S. 461 (2003).
459
425 U.S. 130 (1976).
460
These jurisdictions are required to submit-preclear-proposed changes with respect to voting with the Department of Justice.
461
Id. at 138-41.
462
See Ashcrofi, 539 U.S. at 482-83.
463
See id. at 481.
464
Id. at 482.
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not violate § 5.465 However, as the dissent powerfully argues, once
one opens up the door for coalition and influence districts, it becomes almost impossible to ascertain an administrable baseline for determining retrogression. 466 Thus, it is a mistake to rely on the race
cases as perfect examples of adjudication on the basis of individual
rights; once one removes the evidentiary challenges in the race context, the background structural assumptions made by the courts,
which give content to the "individual right," become easier to
perceive.
Both Miller v. Johnson46 7 and Easley v. Cromartie68 are cases in
which the state (Georgia and North Carolina respectively) manipulated electoral lines in order to facilitate the representation of African
American voters. 469 The district at issue in Miller, however, was much
more "bizarrely shaped" 47 0 than the district at issue in Easley. The
472
471
Court found a constitutional violation in Miller but not in Easley.
Miller can be understood as the Court's reaction to the graphically
demonstrable extent of the state's manipulation. 4 73 By contrast, the
Court did not exhibit the same visceral reaction in Easley, even though
it involved comparable race-conscious line-drawing by the state.
Similarly, compare Whitcomb v. Chavis in which the plurality concluded that there was no racial vote dilution,4 74 with White v. Regester
in which the Court held that there was racial vote dilution. 47 5 Whitcomb and White are fairly analogous cases with one exception: In White,
the extent of the history of discrimination against African and Mexican Americans in Texas played a large role in persuading the
Court.4 76 Thus, Miller and White present examples of states' uses of

race that are more offensive-from the perspective of the Courtthan Easley and Whitcomb.
One must resist the temptation to view these cases in evidentiary
terms-that the plaintiffs provided better evidence in Gomillion, White,
and Miller than did the plaintiffs in Whitcomb and Easley. The point
here is that these cases were not really governed by a theory of harm
465
466
467

See id. at 482-83.
See id. at 492-96 (Souter, J., dissenting).
515 U.S. 900 (1995).
468
532 U.S. 234 (2001).
469
See id. at 237 (North Carolina); Miller, 515 U.S. at 903 (Georgia).
470 See Shaw v. Reno, 509 U.S. 630, 655-56 (1993) (discussing the appellants' claim
regarding the district's irregular shape).
471
See 515 U.S. at 918.
472 See 532 U.S. at 258.
473 See, e.g.,
515 U.S. at 924 ("It would appear the Government was driven by its policy
of maximizing majority-black districts.").
474 403 U.S. 124, 163 (1971) (plurality opinion).
475 412 U.S. 755, 769-70 (1973).
476 See id. at 768-69.
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but instead by the Court's visceral reaction to the state's distortion.
This intuitive reaction to the nature of the facts created a misleading
sense that a baseline actually existed, when in fact it did not.
While the race cases may be helpful for thinking about politics,
the true lesson is one about manipulation, not race or individual
rights. Consider the case of United Jewish Organizations v. Carey
(UJO). 4 7 7 In UJO, New York State divided the Williamsburg Hasidic
community between two state senate districts and two state assembly
districts, ostensibly in order to meet the requirements of § 5 of the
VRA. 4 78 In the previous iteration of its redistricting plan, New York
had placed its Hasidic community of approximately 30,000 individuals
in one senate district and one assembly district.479 New York argued
that it needed to split the Hasidic community in order to increase the
population of voters of color in that assembly district from 61% to
65%.480

Plaintiffs, representing members of the Hasidic community, sued
to enjoin the districting plan. 481

They argued that the plan diluted

their votes in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment and that the
plan constituted a racial gerrymander in violation of the Fifteenth
Amendment. 482 In a highly fractured plurality opinion authored by
Justice White, the Court upheld the plan on the ground that it was
consistent with the aims of the VRA and did not violate the Four48 3
teenth and Fifteenth Amendments.

UJO presents in stark terms the primary, recurrent, and unavoidable question regarding the degree to which the Constitution limits the
discretion of state actors in controlling electoral outcomes. Despite
the state's overt use of race, religion, and ethnicity in UJO, one must
not focus blindingly on the "searing question of race" in the design of
electoral institutions.

48

4

Admittedly, race-conscious districting has become much more
controversial since the series of racial districting decisions starting
with Shaw v. Reno.4 85 Though one may argue that the Constitution

should accord special solicitude to the electoral concerns of voters of
color, the Court has repeatedly rejected the argument both in equal
protection cases and cases dealing with law and the democratic pro430 U.S. 144 (1977).
See id. at 152.
479 See id.
480 See id.
481
See id. at 152-53.
482 See id.
483 See id. at 166-68 (plurality opinion).
484 Issacharoff, supra note 4, at 597.
485 Easley v. Cromartie, 532 U.S. 234 (2001); Bush v. Vera, 517 U.S. 952 (1996); Miller
v. Johnson, 515 U.S. 900 (1995); Shaw v. Reno, 509 U.S. 630 (1993).
477
478
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cess. 486 Consequently, the Court today might be less likely to uphold
the UJO redistricting plan to the extent that it is understood to represent an instance of excessive racialization of democratic
48 7
institutions.
Conversely, one could argue that racial considerations are invidious and should therefore be eliminated from the design of electoral
structures. However, that argument also does not reflect current doctrine, 488 and justifiably so, because removing race as a consideration
in the design of electoral structures would infringe upon the associational interests of voters of color when race and political identity are
correlated. 489 Accordingly, one should not focus on the use of race in
UJ0. Indeed, focusing on race helps only to the extent that it leads
one to reject the twin extremes of excessive race-consciousness and
race-blindness. Whatever troubles us about cases such as UJO must
therefore reach beyond the state's racial motivation. Thus, race-con490
scious districting is not the real problem in UJO.
UJO illustrates quite vividly how political elites, as opposed to the
preferences of the electorate, selected political winners and losers by
the manner in which the state constructed electoral institutions. The
Hasidim lost the political power they held in their assembly and senate districts not because the voter preferences changed, but because
political elites wielding the power of New York State decided to manipulate political outcomes. African American and Latino voters
maintained or increased their political power not because of different
political tastes, but because the state decided to trade off the electoral
interests of the Hasidic community for those of voters of color.
49 1
The Hasidim, in effect, became the ultimate "filler people."
Their preassigned task, as explained by Professor Issacharoff with
characteristic eloquence, was "to play the role of inert gases in the
political atmosphere: sufficiently numerous to create the needed population density of a district, but not so substantial as to alter the functioning of the prearranged political balance." 492 In other words, the
state dictated ex ante that the Hasidim would be political losers and
expected them to accept that determination.
Though the Court in UJO focused exclusively on race, its fundamental problem, also seen in the Court's racial and political gerry486
487
488

See Briffault, supra note 154.
See Aleinikoff & Issacharoff, supra note 105, at 597.
See Easley v. Cromartie, 532 U.S. 234 (2001); Charles, Identity, supra note 16, at

1212.
See Charles, Identity, supra note 16, at 1215-16.
Id. at 1212-13; Fuentes-Rohwer, supra note 147, at 580-81; Issacharoff, supra note
4, at 596-97.
491
Aleinikoff & Issacharoff, supra note 105, at 601.
492
Issacharoff, supra note 135, at 902-03.
489
490
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mandering cases, is the virtually unfettered discretion of state actors in
493
distorting political outcomes by manipulating electoral institutions.
The use of race, in UJO specifically and in racial districting cases generally, illuminates how political elites distort electoral structures and
the consequences of such distortions. 49 4 Put differently, courts must

look beyond qualms about race-consciousness conceived so grotesquely in racial terms, which preoccupied the Court in UJO and the
Shaw line of cases, to the fact and extent of the state's manipulation.
They must also come to terms with the proposition that these manipulations challenge our deepest principles of representative democracy
because they alter or undermine democratic outcomes.
This explains the difficulty in determining the constitutional
harm in Gomillion (and in the racial vote dilution cases in general).
The harm cannot be a denial of the right to vote. The plaintiffs could
vote; they would simply have had to do so in another city. 495 In addition, the harm cannot simply be that the state took race into account. 49 6 The vote dilution cases partly implicate race, but they also

implicate (and maybe more so) the distortion of the very mechanism
that legitimates democratic outcomes.
Thus, the pressing question is whether we ought to be less troubled, as a constitutional matter, if we substitute the Hasidim in UJO with
Republicans and the voters of color with Democrats. 49 7 To paraphrase the Court in Shaw v. Reno, is there not a constitutional principle that is at war with the notion that the state can prescribe that
District A must be represented by a Democrat and District B by a Republican? 4 98 Given the importance of political identity, which is at
least as important as racial identity in the electoral context, courts
must justify permitting the state to manipulate political identity willynilly. 499 For those judges who would find political gerrymandering
493
See Issacharoff, supra note 4, at 597; see also Aleinikoff & Issacharoff, supra note 105,
at 629 ("Under any discretionary districting system, state authorities arrogate to themselves
the ability and authority to determine how representation will be allocated, and which
individuals or groups will be frustrated participants in the electoral marketplace.").
494
See Issacharoff, supra note 4, at 597 (noting that the racial districting cases "reveal[ ] not only ongoing doctrinal battles over the application of the antidiscrimination
norm to state action deemed beneficial to racial minorities, but also something deeper
about the relation between constitutional law and politics").
495
See Gomillion v. Lightfoot, 364 U.S. 339, 349 (1960) (Whitaker, J., concurring).
496
See Easley v. Cromartie, 532 U.S. 234 (2001); UJO, 430 U.S. 144 (1977).
497
See, e.g., Davis v. Bandemer, 478 U.S. 109, 123 (1986) (stating that political gerrymandering claims are no less justiciable than racial gerrymandering claims).
498
See 509 U.S. 630, 648 (1993).
499
This is the reverse of the argument advanced by Jamin Raskin that the Court's
racial districting doctrine maintains a double standard by recognizing all other bases of
political identification as legitimate but excluding racial identity as the only illegitimate
basis for political identification. SeeJamin B. Raskin, The Supreme Court'sRacialDouble Standard in Redistricting: Unequal Protection in Politics and the Scholarship that Defends It, 14 J.L. &
POL. 591 (1998).
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nonjusticiable, the central task is devising a compelling justification
for a constitutional posture that would allow the state to predetermine
winners and losers by the manner in which it designs electoral
institutions.
The race cases therefore involve considerations that are no less
structural because of their adjudication in the context of race rather
than the context of politics. Furthermore, as the race cases perhaps
demonstrate, these structural considerations cannot be ignored simply because we must come to terms with some first-order difficulties in
order to make use of them.
b.

StructuralJudgments in the PoliticalDilution Cases

The problem for courts that address structural claims is that while
a structural approach more directly and honestly confronts the issues
that the courts are actually addressing and the considerations that direct the courts' resolution of those issues, the courts themselves are at
sea when it comes to translating those structural values into workable
adjudicatory principles. It is difficult for courts to directly answer
questions such as whether political gerrymandering is consistent with
the Constitution, or, whether elections are contested or responsive.
Courts often lack the traditional doctrinal principles-culled particularly from the individual rights context-that guide the adjudicatory
process and define the role of the judiciary in other contexts. To resolve these problems in the reapportionment context, the Supreme
Court often uses rights-speak to direct judicial review, even where the
5 00
Court's reasoning belies structuralist concerns.
Consider once more Gray and the constitutionality of Georgia's
county unit system, which allocated more weight to rural counties
than to urban counties. 50 ' The Court's attempt to equate malapportionment with a denial of the right to vote bespeaks a conception of
how the design of electoral structures affects political power that is
sophisticated, functional, and structural-as opposed to sterile, formalistic, or individualist. Notwithstanding the individualist reference
to the voter's dignity, the Court clearly recognized that the functional
problem with Georgia's county unit system was that it "weigh [ed] the
rural vote more heavily than the urban vote and ... some small rural
counties heavier than other larger rural counties. ' 50 2 Similarly, in

Wesberry, the Court relied upon a structural approach to support its
conclusion that judicial review of the manner in which votes are
500
See, e.g., Lucas v. Forty-Fourth Gen. Assembly, 377 U.S. 713 (1964); Reynolds v.
Sims, 377 U.S. 533 (1964); Wesberry v.Sanders, 376 U.S. 1 (1964); Gray v.Sanders, 372
U.S. 368 (1963).
501
See Gray, 372 U.S. at 379.
502
Id.
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counted vindicates structural values. 503 Ballot stuffing, which the
Court viewed as analogous to malapportionment, did not offend the
dignity of the voter-an individualist value-but did undermine the
50 4
integrity of the political process-a structural value.
As the Court recognized in the above apportionment cases, the
state had created an electoral structure that would be responsive to
the needs of an incrementally smaller but more powerful political minority. The state intended the design of the electoral structure to
make the political process less sensitive to majoritarian preferences.
Or perhaps more accurately, the state intended the structure to set an
upper limit beyond which the political process would not be responsive to majority interests.
Representative democracy, however, depends on electoral institutions to facilitate the central aims of democratic politics.

50 5

Electoral

structures matter because they are the medium through which the
ideals of democratic principles, such as the notion of self-government,
are realized. 50 6 The Court essentially said as much in Wesberry, the
Georgia congressional malapportionment case:
To say that a vote is worth more in one district than in another
would not only run counter to our fundamental ideas of democratic
government, it would cast aside the principle of a House of Representatives elected 'by the People,' a principle tenaciously fought for
50 7
and established at the Constitutional Convention.

Thus, the Court concluded that "[n]o right is more precious in a free
country than that of having a voice in the election of those who make
50 8
the laws under which, as good citizens, we must live."

Recall also that in Lucas, the plaintiffs challenged a reapportionment scheme that voters in Colorado enacted that apportioned the
State House, but not the State Senate, on a per-population basis. 50 9
Lucas differed from the other apportionment cases-Baker,Gray, WesSee Wesbeny, 376 U.S. at 17-18.
See id. at 17 (asserting that ballot stuffing infringes upon the constitutionally mandated voting process).
505
See, e.g.,
Reynolds, 377 U.S. at 561-62.
503

504

506

See, e.g., id.

507

Wesberny, 376 U.S. at 8.
Id. at 17. As the Court famously stated in Reynolds.

508

Undoubtedly, the right of suffrage is a fundamental matter in a free and
democratic society. Especially since the right to exercise the franchise in a
free and unimpaired manner is preservative of other basic civil and political
rights, any alleged infringement of the right of citizens to vote must be
carefully and meticulously scrutinized.
377 U.S. at 561-62.
509
See 377 U.S. at 713, 717-18 ("Amendment No. 7 ... provided for the apportionment of the House of Representatives on the basis of population, but essentially maintained the existing apportionment in the Senate, which was based on a combination of
population and various other factors.").
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berry, and Reynolds-in a number of respects. First, unlike those cases,
Lucas was not a case about entrenchment as a consequence of neglect
as political actors did not attempt to thwart the accountability function of elections by refusing to apportion. Colorado had reapportioned the state's legislature every decade, with one exception, since
the adoption of the state's constitution. 51 0 In fact, the state had redistricted the year before Lucas came before the Court.51I Second, the
state provided for an initiative process that the voters used on a number of occasions, including the apportionment scheme that was at issue in Lucas, to enact their preferences into law. 51 2 So, this was not a
case about self-interested political actors attempting to rig the rules of
the game in their favor. Third, a majority of the State's voters, including majorities in each county, voted in favor of the scheme at issue in
Colorado. 51 3 Moreover, in the very same election in which the voters
adopted the reapportionment plan, they rejected a competing initiative that would have mandated population equality. 514 Therefore, this
was not a case about minority entrenchment. Lastly, because one of
the two houses was apportioned substantially on a per-population basis,5 Lucas did not present a clear-cut case of minority rule.
Notwithstanding that the Court cast the constitutional violation
in individual rights terms, what individual right did the Colorado's
apportionment scheme violate? The only hint in the opinion is the
statement that "[a]n individual's constitutionally protected right to
cast an equally weighted vote cannot be denied even by a vote of a
majority of a State's electorate."' 5 16 From an individualist perspective,
this is a puzzling statement. Was the Court really concerned about the
minority of voters-almost one out of three-who could not persuade
the majority of voters not to divest themselves of political power? Supposing that a substantial majority of Colorado's voters had agreed to
provide two votes to rural residents and one vote to urban residents,
would it be sensible to frame this intentional choice as an individual
rights problem?
To make any sense of Lucas, one must look beyond the Court's
assertions about individual rights to an inchoate, but more robust,
concern with the primary rules that govern fundamental democratic
representative institutions. Lucas is really a case about institutional de510
511
512

obtain
513

7 by a
514
515
516

See id. at 723.
See id. at 727.
See id. at 732 ("[T]he initiative device provides a practicable political remedy to
relief against alleged legislative malapportionment .... ").
See id. at 717, 731 ("[T]he Colorado electorate adopted proposed Amendment No.
vote of 305,700 to 172,725 ...
.
Seeid. at 717.
See id. at 727.
Id. at 736.
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sign and institutional distortion. The question in Lucas was whether
the state's urban majority consented to provide greater political power
to the state's rural minority as a matter of institutional design. 517 For
the Court, the principle of majoritarian responsiveness as a question
of institutional design was so strong that it would not acquiesce to the
voters' choice unless a majority of Colorado's citizens made a "clearcut" choice in favor of an electoral structure that was less responsive to
majoritarian interests. 5 18 The Court concluded that the choice was
not clear-cut because of structural defects in the decision-making process. 5 19 For example, the Court explained that the "[b]allots were
long and cumbersome."5 20
The Court also made some interesting comments on the role of
representatives in the preference formation of citizens. As a consequence of the use of at-large multimember districts, the Court stated,
"[n]o identifiable constituencies within the populous counties resulted, and the residents of those areas had no single member of the
Senate or House elected specifically to represent them." 52 1 This is
why the Court concluded that the voters of Colorado had not made a
522
choice about institutional structure that the Court should respect.

Fundamentally, the rights discourse that permeates Lucas and the
reapportionment cases reflects the traditional deployment of rights
not as trumps, but as instrumental devices "to regulate the institutional arrangements within which politics is conducted." 523 In so doing, the Court uses rights discourse to domesticate amorphous
structural concepts-such as fairness-and render them amenable to
judicial review.
V
ADMINISTRABILITY AND POLITICAL GERRYMANDERING

From the insight of the dilution cases, the problem of administrability-developing a standard for determining the legality of political gerrymandering-becomes a more manageable inquiry. In the
political gerrymandering cases, the Court has come to terms with the
fact that harm, defined as distortion of electoral structures by political
elites, cannot be evaluated ex post in an atomized, case-by-case context. Drawing once again on and paraphrasing Pitkin, harm is de517

See id. at 732.

518

Id. at 731.

519
520
521

See id.
Id.
Id.

522
See id. at 732 (" [T] he assumption of the court below that the Colorado voters made
a definitive choice between two contrasting alternatives and indicated that 'minority process in the Senate is what they want' does not appear to be factually justifiable.").
523 See Karlan, supra note 139, at 1346.
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fined not necessarily by examining particular elections at particular
moments, but rather by the long-term effect of manipulation on governance institutions and the way they function. 524 If this institutional
account of harm is correct, then courts cannot, except under the most
egregious facts, directly answer these difficult questions posed by individualists in the context of specific cases-e.g., how much manipulation is too much, the appropriate level of competition, and whether
endogeneity or exogeneity applies.
A.

Ex Ante Administrable Standards

The genius of the political gerrymandering cases is the Court's
recognition of the need for ex ante rules to cabin the discretion of
political elites in order to minimize the predilection of state actors to
engage in institutional distortion. 525 To facilitate that goal, the Court
developed a series of devices that minimize, if not resolve, the administrability problem. The following three are worth considering.
1. EquipopulationPrinciple
The first device that minimizes the administrability problem is
the equipopulation principle. 526 The one-person, one-vote standard,
generally viewed as the quintessential expression of an individual
right,52 7 is actually better understood as ajudicially imposed structural

limitation
institutions.

on

528

the ability

of state

actors

to

design

electoral

Indeed, treating the equipopulation principle as conferring an
individual right raises a host of troubling questions. 529 For example,
some have noted that the Census Bureau's methods for counting individuals are disturbingly inaccurate. 530 Further, to the extent that the
census is accurate, it is probably accurate for only the first election in
See PITKIN, supra note 28, at 234.
See Issacharoff, supra note 4, at 643 (outlining the advantages of an ex ante
approach).
526
See Pamela S. Karlan, The Fire Next Time: Reapportionment After the 2000 Census, 50
STAN. L. REV. 731, 741 (1998).
527
See id. ("One person, one vote is the paradigmatic 'objective' rule.").
528
See Samuel Issacharoff, Judging Politics: The Elusive Quest forJudicial Review of Political
Fairness, 71 TEX. L. REV. 1643, 1669 (1993) ("One can understand the role of the oneperson, one-vote rule as that of an externally imposed constraint prompted by the failure
of legislative bodies to bind themselves to a meaningful precommitment strategy for
apportionment.").
529
See Richard Briffault, The Contested Right to Vote, 100 MICH. L. REV. 1506, 1509 (2002)
(book review) ("The significance of popular voting in our political process remains a matter of politics as much as it is a matter of rights.").
See e.g., Dep't of Commerce v. U.S. House of Representatives, 525 U.S. 316, 322-23
530
(1999) (noting that the census "has always failed to reach ... a portion of the population,"
and that "certain minorities... have historically had substantially higher undercount rates
than the population as a whole"); Nathaniel Persily, Color by Numbers: Race, Redistricting, and
524
525
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a ten-year cycle; in many jurisdictions, individuals reside in districts
53
that are quite unequal by the end of the ten-year redistricting cycle. '
Finally, viewing the equipopulation principle as an individual right
does not explain why the Court refuses to tolerate even minor deviations in population equality with respect to congressional districts but
tolerates substantial inequality with respect to state and local districts. 5 3 2 If, however, the purpose of the one-person, one-vote rule is
simply to serve as an external check on manipulation by political
elites, then these shortcomings are significant only to the extent that
they inhibit the rule from performing its instrumental purpose.

2.

Presumption of Unconstitutionality

The second device is a presumption of unconstitutionality. In

Reynolds v. Sims, 533 the Court constrained the behavior of political
elites by establishing a presumption of unconstitutionality with respect
to a certain type of state inaction. 53 4 In Reynolds, the Court advised the
states to reapportion every ten years; otherwise, the Court would deem
any extant apportionment presumptively unconstitutional. 535 The
Court stated:
While we do not intend to indicate that decennial reapportionment
is a constitutional requisite, compliance with such an approach
would clearly meet the minimal requirements for maintaining a reasonably current scheme of legislative representation. And we do
not mean to intimate that more frequent reapportionment would
not be constitutionally permissible or practicably desirable. But if
reapportionment were accomplished with less frequency, it would
53 6
assuredly be constitutionally suspect.
As one commentator observed, by coupling the de facto decennial
apportionment with the equipopulation principle, the Court "provided the functional equivalent of a first-order precommitment
5 37
strategy."

3.

Shaw's Bizarre-Shape Test

The third device is the bizarre-shape test principle, which is
found in the line of cases that begins with Shaw v. Reno.538 In Shaw
the 2000 Census, 85 MINN. L. REv. 899 (2001) (discussing the "endemic undercount[ing]"
of some minority groups and the attempt to remedy it in the 2000 census).
531
See Levinson, supra note 405, at 1278-80.
532
Cf Grofman, supra note 334, at 41-43 (discussing the Court's differential treatment
of statewide and district-specific gerrymandering claims).

536

377 U.S. 533 (1964).
See id. 583-84.
See id.
Id. at 563-64.

537
538

Issacharoff, supra note 528, at 1669.
509 U.S. 630 (1993).

533
534

535
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and its progeny, the Court used the shape of the district to identify
institutional distortions ex ante and to constrain what it viewed as the
willingness of political elites to distort electoral lines for racial purposes. 53 9 Shaw is similar to the political gerrymandering cases in that
while the excessive manipulation of electoral lines to achieve representation for voters of color troubled the Court, it was not prepared to
5 40
hold that race could not be a factor in the line-drawing process.
Thus, the Court needed to develop a standard that would distinguish
permissible from impermissible race-consciousness.
An important part of the problem here is evidentiary: How is a
court to know whether the state actor was motivated by too much race
consciousness or just enough? In the early Shaw cases, the evidentiary
question was much less salient because elected officials admitted that
race primarily influenced the lines. 541 The Court also resolved the
evidentiary problem in part by focusing on the shape of the district
itself. 542 The Court explained that "redistricting legislation that is so
extremely irregular on its face that it rationally can be viewed only as
an effort to segregate the races for purposes of voting" is justiciable
under the Fourteenth Amendment. 543 The Court developed what has
come to be known as the bizarre-shape test, by which it meant that
"highly irregular" race-conscious line-drawing may violate the Consti544
tution if the district's shape becomes too bizarre.
There are a number of ways to understand Shaw's standard. First,
one could view Shaw as the Court's attempt to identify only "extreme"
instances of manipulation for racial purposes. 545 This reading would
concede that while the Constitution may idealize color blindness,
practical considerations-such as evidentiary difficulties or the fact
539
See Vieth v. Jubelirer, 541 U.S. 267, 321 (2004) (Stevens, J., dissenting); Shaw, 509
U.S. at 646.
540
See supra Part lI.D.
541
Granted, the officials thought the VRA defended their actions, but once the Court

decided that the VRA did not require the officials' actions, the evidentiary problem was
solved when states admitted that race influenced the line-drawing. See, e.g., Miller v. Johnson, 515 U.S. 900, 917-28 (1995).
542
See Shaw, 509 U.S. at 642, 646.
543

Id.
Id. at 646. In Miller v. Johnson, the Court introduced a different test-the predominant factor test-which provided that a state violates the Equal Protection Clause when it
uses race as the predominant factor in redistricting. See 515 U.S. at 901. However, the
bizarre-shape test continues to functionally direct the inquiry. See Guy-Uriel E. Charles &
Luis Fuentes-Rohwer, Challenges to Racial Redistricting in the New Millennium: Hunt v. Cromartie as a Case Study, 58 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 227, 250 (2001).
545
E.g., Miller, 515 U.S. at 929 (O'Connor, J., concurring) (describing "Shaw's basic
objective" as "making extreme instances of gerrymandering subject to meaningful judicial
review"); Charles & Fuentes-Rohwer, supra note 544, at 302 (noting that Shaw applied to
"extreme cases of racial redistricting").
544
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that race continues to be a basis for political identity-may necessitate
546
a compromise.
Second, Shaw can be viewed as a signaling case. Prior to Shaw,
one could have argued that redistricters were not aware that there
were constitutional limitations on their ability to manipulate electoral
lines in order to facilitate representation on behalf of voters of color.
Alternatively, one could argue that to the extent that redistricters were
aware of constitutional limitations prior to Shaw, they doubted
whether the Court would enforce those limitations. 5 47 Shaw signaled
the fact that there were limitations, and Shaw's progeny signaled the
Court's willingness to police those boundaries. 548 Under this reading,
what matters is not whether the Court communicated a clear standard
for bizarreness; indeed, the assumption here is that the standard was
rather vague. 549 What mattered instead is that the Court sent a clear
signal that it was going to enforce the constitutional limitations. The
clarity of the signal thus reduced the possibility that the vague stan5 50
dard would provide an incentive to litigate.
A third reading of Shaw, which would harmonize it with Reynolds,
would be to view it as resting on an irrebuttable presumption, or per
se rule, that districts that are both race-consciously drawn and bizarrely shaped are presumptively unconstitutional. 55 1 Shaw's bizarreshape test, then, could be understood as a prophylactic rule designed
5 52
to cabin the discretion of political elites.
B.

Application to Political Gerrymandering

These above devices constitute a number of options for a court
confronting the problem of administrability in the context of political
gerrymandering. First, where the state admits that partisanship was its
primary motivation in promulgating a redistricting plan, courts may
strike down the plan. There is no administrability or evidentiary problem when the statements of relevant state actors are clear and uneCharles & Fuentes-Rohwer, supra note 544, at 237-41.
See id. at 300-03.
The fact that redistricters changed their behavior supports this reading. As demonstrated by Easley v. Cromartie,532 U.S. 234 (2001), state actors have tended to draw fewer
majority-minority districts or, at least, to draw them less bizarrely after the Shaw cases.
549
The Court did not define bizarreness and did not rely upon objective tests that
measure a district's shape.
550
See Aleinikoff & Issacharoff, supra note 105, at 604 ("[V]ague norms, especially
norms that may not be enforced at all, will produce costly litigation and serious uncertainty
about important political events."). But see Pildes, supra note 15, at 67-68 (accrediting the
paucity of Shaw litigation in the post-2000 round of redistricting to state actors' having
internalized the message of Shaw).
551
See Melissa L. Saunders, Essay, Reconsidering Shaw: The Miranda of Race-Conscious
Districting,109 YALE L.J. 1603 (2000).
552
See id. at 1605-11.
546

547
548
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quivocal. The Court employed this technique in the racial
gerrymandering cases rather successfully. Admittedly, redistricters
could respond by trying to conceal their intentions. If redistricters
attempt to conceal their intentions, however, this will likely also reduce the probability that states will be able to enact extreme political
gerrymanders.
Second, following in the tradition of the reapportionment cases,
courts could enact, ex ante, a per se rule. Assuming that courts are
right to be troubled, as a constitutional matter, by excessive partisan
manipulation of redistricting lines, and assuming that courts are unable to distinguish excessive from nonexcessive partisan manipulation,
courts could conclude that redistricting conducted by elected officials
would be-to use the language of the Court in Reynolds-"constitutionally suspect."553 This proposal would adequately address the evidentiary problem. It would also be administrable, given that courts
could provide a safe harbor for redistricting conducted by nonparti5 54
san redistricting or advisory commissions.
Third, following from Shaw v. Reno, courts could constrain redistricters by limiting the structural devices at the redistricters' disposal.
For example in Shaw, the Court focused on bizarrely shaped majorityminority districts. Perhaps an analogous device in the context of political gerrymandering is single-member districting. The capability of
drawing multiple lines-a state of affairs maximized by the option of
drawing single-member districts-facilitates the ability to engage in
gerrymandering. 55 5 If one limits the number of lines that redistricters
could draw, one could impose some constraints on their ability to gerrymander. 556 One possibility, then, is for courts to apply strict scrutiny
when state actors use single-member districts in their redistricting
plans or to prohibit state actors from using single-member districts
altogether.

553 Sam Issacharoff recently advanced these suggestions, and commentators have heavily criticized him for it. See Issacharoff, supra note 4, 630-38. If the arguments advanced in
this Article are right, however, then the criticisms of Issacharoffs proposal were largely
misplaced.
554
For a nice exposition on the benefits of advisory commissions, see Christopher S.
Elmendorf, Representation Reinforcement Through Advisoy Commissions: The Case of Election
Law, 80 N.Y.U. L. REv. 1366 (2005).
555
Of course one would have to use alternative voting structures to protect the rights
of citizens protected by the Voting Rights Act when appropriate or numerical minorities
more broadly.
556
This would not eliminate gerrymandering, as it is possible to gerrymander even in
multimember systems. But it would make gerrymandering more difficult and in some
cases-particularly when the state is trying to maximize a number of values-extremely
difficult.
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Fourth, courts could simply declare that partisan intent or excessive partisan intent is unconstitutional. 557 Of course, this declaration
would run into evidentiary problems. However, to the extent that the
problem is the failure of the courts to send a clear message that they
are willing to strike down extreme political gerrymanders-as opposed to the problem being shirking, a propensity by state actors to
evade constitutional norms-one should expect compliance from political elites even if the substantive standard is vague. This is what happened following both the reapportionment revolution and the
modern racial gerrymandering cases.
CONCLUSION

An important part of the inquiry that underlies the dispute over
the constitutionalization of the democratic process is whether it is sensible to try to give full effect to fundamental democratic principles in a
mature democracy. We have elections that can be contested and are
generally respected. Moreover, candidates and voters can speak
freely, gather together, and campaign. This may be the best that we
can expect in a mature democracy. We can also expect the courts to
assure minimum contestation and free elections-but not much
more.
However, maybe we can expect our democratic principles to be
given more than minimum effect. In that case, we might have a more
responsive political process, and one in which participation is sufficiently consequential. Perhaps the rules of the game do matter a
great deal more than we think.
In this Article, I have advanced a theory of political equality that
raises questions about the role of political elites in designing governance institutions. I have argued that though courts need not address
the problem of manipulation of electoral structures by elected officials, courts can do so within the framework that they have established
for addressing other problems of the law of democracy. Indeed, as
the Article points out, the reapportionment cases are useful models
for thinking about political gerrymandering. Once the Court appreciated the nature of the harm in these cases, it employed an appropriate
remedy. Moreover, there are clues in Vieth that the Court is capable of
rising to the challenge. In particular, all of the Justices in Vieth identified the harm in structural terms. 558 What they were really disagree557 The effect of this declaration-making all districts in the country unconstitutional-would be similar to what happened after Baker v. Carr and the reapportionment
cases, and the republic survived then; I suspect it would continue to survive were the Court
to go down the path of declaring partisan intent or excessive partisan intent
unconstitutional.
558 See supra p. 639.
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ing over was whether these types of structural issues are capable of
5

adjudication.

59

If the pro-justiciability Justices are going to tackle the problem of
political gerrymandering, they are going need to do so within a different paradigm. They are going to have to come to terms with what I
have called here the harm of institutional distortion, and they are going to have to grow accustomed to using a dualistic framework-an
individual rights framework crafted to address a structural problem.
It may be that the law of politics has nothing useful to say about
representation and institutional distortion, and it may also be the case
that courts have nothing to offer in the resolution of this problem.
However, before going down that path and leaving us to the wolves,
the Court owes us all the obligation of making a better effort.

559

See supra p. 640.
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